

Countering State Capture

Portfolio Review of the Think Tank Fund Thematic Initiative

October 15, 2015

Executive Summary

In this portfolio TTF is pioneering demonstration projects countering state capture. State capture is the institutionalized particularistic influence of organized actors over policy formation and implementation, which negatively impacts the fundamentals of a democratic system, the logic of governance, social norms, and trust in public institutions. A captured state directly contradicts the idea of an open society. In this portfolio we have worked to support grantees countering state capture in a number of countries. At the same time, we have invested in improving conceptual clarity by identifying differences between state capture as a problem requiring a systemic approach and issues of transparency and accountability that could be tackled through anti-corruption measures.

While we are only at the outset in terms of the conceptual work, through our portfolio we have gained experience that has enabled us to understand how to steer not only our grantee-partners to take a systemic approach, but also to inspire other donors¹ to rethink their approach to the issue. The lessons we learned on supporting coalitions, on shaping the field of anti-corruption, accountability and good governance, and on selection of best instruments of support will help us adjust and integrate similar work of OSIFE into a single consolidated portfolio in 2016, based on TTF's theory of change and conceptual groundwork.

Introduction

Building upon a legacy of support since November 2006, this work was reorganized into an independent portfolio in a follow-up to the TTF sub-board review on October 27, 2011.² We further streamlined the portfolio during the process before the TTF strategy for 2014-17. In line with this strategy, we formed a fully separate portfolio, budget, and category of work, under the Level 3 program name of “[2B Countering State Capture](#),” identical with the category of work “CTI002-THINK TANK FUND: Support demonstration projects [Countering State Capture].”

Theory of Change

This portfolio is based on an assumption that a captured state—substantial, institutionalized, particularistic, self-interested influence or control of unrepresentative actors over public finances, policy formation and implementation—directly contradicts the idea of an open society. State capture is one of the most daunting issues in state reform and transition, a fundamental challenge for weak states and societies where the watchdog function of civil society is not yet fully developed. State capture negatively impacts the fundamentals of a democratic system, the logic of governance, social norms, and trust in public institutions.

While state capture is sometimes mistaken for grand corruption and conventional anti-corruption measures are therefore proposed to counter it, these address only the design of nominally independent state institutions, overlooking the structure of the political system and the prevailing value structure of societies. Countering state capture is not primarily anti-corruption work. While corruption may be one of the ways a captured state functions, it is not the only one or the most important, and this needs to be taken into account

¹ Particularly the [European Commission](#), [Porticus](#) (Vienna office), [Let's Stop Corruption foundation](#), but also [Anticorruption Endowment](#) and [Otakar Motejl Fund](#).

² Details of the 2011 portfolio review write-up are in the [board memorandum document](#) pages 41-50, [minutes](#) of that meeting pages 11-13, and the accompanying [background analysis](#).

when designing an approach to tackling it. Too much emphasis on corruption can detract from real governance problems. Hungary provides a real-world example. While there is wide consensus that the grasp of the ruling government on public life and the extent of state capture is unprecedented, perception of corruption in Hungary in the past two years is at its lowest level since 1995, when Transparency International inaugurated the Corruption Perceptions Index.

This observation is consistent with our own theory of change, where we argue that state capture as an organized system can in fact be one of the most effective means of reducing corruption. Corruption outside of the state capture context is essentially a pluralist exercise, with individuals and business paying a bribe in hopes of affecting the outcome, but without having full certainty over it. In a captured state the outcome is predetermined, regardless of whether the transaction involves corruption. If there is corruption in a captured state, it is mostly a streamlined, controlled, and organized tool assuring particularism of the ruling elites.

State Capture vs Anti-Corruption: Key Distinctions

This distinction between corruption and state capture is important in the remedies that it implies. We see corruption as a possible but not always necessary tool of organized particularism. Organizations using anti-corruption lenses, especially watchdogs, tend to focus on individual cases and work on the basis of a [theory of change](#) that emphasizes the moral failure of the individual and the belief that more public information about the case will bring about the necessary policy change. Unfortunately we have not seen this theory deliver. The extent of corruption in CEE countries is widely known, and even when a surprise release of information happens, or the arrogance of captors crosses the threshold of public acceptance, it rarely leads to sustained public pressure for reform. For example, the [Gorilla scandal](#) in Slovakia in 2011 and the appointment in summer of 2013 of [Delyan Peevski](#) as head of the secret service in Bulgaria both led to mass protests and the firing of exposed individuals, but the public response in itself was not sufficient to achieve systemic change.

When corruption is observed in a captured state, policies based on suppressing it (or its publicity) frequently result in a disproportionate emphasis on petty corruption, rather than delivering better governance and higher public trust in democracy. In Slovakia, for example, according to [TI data](#) 48% of corruption cases that made it to court were for bribes below €20 (\$22) and only three percent for bribes over €5,000 (\$5,586). Only five percent of all cases involved public governance (procurements, elections, subsidies), and not a single corruption case involving senior elected or government official made it to court.

Because state capture is systemic, yet highly varied in form, countering it requires a different approach from fighting corruption in a functioning democracy. Policy-makers, practitioners, and concerned citizens who wish to address state capture must gain detailed, documented information about actual structures and processes that accompany it. When state captors enjoy full judicial impunity, exposing individual cases does not deliver policy improvements, but rather contributes to citizens' disenchantment with democracy, leading to lower voter turnout and/or increased support for extremist political parties. The election of the radical neo-fascist Marian Kotleba in central Slovakia is an example of this dynamic.

State capture is based on an opaque relationship between the captors of the state (principals) and their agents in elected or executive positions. Trying to pinpoint where state capture starts is akin to answering the proverbial chicken and egg question; nonetheless we see that financing of political parties is often the egg of state capture. Running a modern political campaign requires excessive amounts of cash.³ On the one hand this creates an insurmountable barrier to entry for potential new political parties outside the establishment, while on the other hand it allows established oligarchs (principals) to diversify their political portfolio and provide support to potential new entrants who offer fresh faces for the public to vote for. This is one of the

³ Partial party financing transparency reforms further increase the need for external actors to provide cash or "in-kind" contributions to pay for political advertisements, whether during the regulated campaign or well before.

explanations why political corruption in Hungary has been on the agenda of only non-mainstream parties such as LMP (*Politics Can Be Different*), and *Jobbik*.

Once the political party makes it into power, it needs to return the favor and pay back its debt. This happens in a number of ways, public procurement being perhaps the most common. Other ways include the placement of captors' agents in important positions, from parliaments to regulatory authorities (where a clear overlap with regulatory capture, which is more common in Western Europe, appears), to the law enforcement and judiciary.⁴

Ultimately, the paths of state capture can be traced along two dimensions: economic resources and political power, with the understanding that these are effectively two sides of the same coin. Political power generates economic resources, and those in turn can be exchanged into and reinforce political power.

Another important aspect where we can clearly discern the captured state is in the erosion of checks and balances, both formal and informal. The capture of watchdog institutions such as the media is a clear marker. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe we see the retreat of economic investors from media ownership, replaced by individuals alleged to be the "owners" or "godfathers" of the state.

Countering State Capture: An Agenda for Change

State capture is as opaque and elusive as it is widespread and deeply rooted, and countering it requires policy reforms that may not favor the ruling elites. This can happen either by stealth, when captors do not realize that a policy concession will limit the scope of capture, or as a result of sustained public pressure under which even captured institutions go against the interests of their captors. Even after such an initial success, the challenge is keeping reformed institutions out of the captors' orbit. In order to make gains permanent, civil society and anti-state capture coalitions need to ensure there is a critical mass of agencies that are not under state capture. It is only in the last phase, once the systemic nature of capture has been broken, that the traditional anti-corruption approach can be utilized and the countering state capture can give way to an accountability approach to countering corruption.

Given the systemic nature of state capture, our hypothesis is that the most effective way of exerting public pressure to counter it is through cooperation and wide coalitions of concerned individuals, NGOs (including watchdogs and think tanks), businesses, and reform-minded politicians. While these coalitions are often able to reap tremendous emotional energy when the public learns of specific instances of state capture, unless they have policy researchers or think tanks involved and able to present workable policy reform recommendations, they often fail to devise feasible and achievable strategies for countering state capture.

We have decided to support specifically think tanks because we believe that coalitions to counter state capture will be ineffective without the intellectual muscle that research centers provide. Based on this theory of change, we have decided to test the hypothesis that think tanks are in a good position to identify the systemic vulnerabilities of the captured state, and devise policy proposals that intellectually support counter-state capture coalitions and help them pressure captured institutions to reform, focusing scarce energies and resources to where the potential for success is largest. Think tanks also have the skill-set to sit through endless technical meetings with ministries, tirelessly follow policy proposals, and push improvements one paragraph at a time, as we have seen with Frank Bold in the Czech Republic, or Via Iuris in Slovakia.

Scope of the Portfolio

The main approach we have employed to test this theory of change is funding demonstration projects. When choosing these projects, we had three priorities: 1) systematic analysis of state capture; 2) remedies to state capture either through development of policy responses or specific support to existing civic coalitions to

⁴ From regional police chiefs, through prosecutors all the way to judges, assuring impunity for captors of the state.

devise and implement policy recommendations and strategic advocacy efforts; and 3) identifying and countering cross-border aspects of state capture.⁵

We have also provided support to networking and knowledge-exchange events for policy research and other civil society actors to analyze and discuss possible approaches to countering state capture. In order to promote the concept of countering state capture systemically, we have also shaped discourse by attending and speaking at conferences, as well as publishing and amplifying features of the demonstration projects we supported. Finally, we have convened new cross-border collaborations among think tanks and helped them in seeking external third-party funding, especially from the European Commission.

From 2012 to date,⁶ the size of this portfolio is \$2,260,093. The portfolio includes 1) organizational project grants (\$2,221,879); 2) networking and knowledge exchange activities consisting of two events supported by TTF (\$28,598), and convening and support of consortia applying for external funding (no direct costs, co-funding of \$50,000 is included in grants); and 3) shaping discourse through external publications both staff-authored and contracted (\$9,616),⁷ and participation of TTF staff in external events.

Analysis of the Portfolio

In order to illustrate the patterns in choices made, developments observed, and lessons learned, we focus our analysis on a country-case selection from five priority countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. We have also provided support to projects in Croatia, Slovenia, and Latvia that we consider “scouting” countries.

Criteria for Evaluating Success

Expecting that a single donor’s effort could liberate the state from its captors would be an ambitious proposition, which we never made. Our expectation for success in supporting these projects was rather in the extent to which they contributed to countering state capture efforts based on a number of factors. We did not conduct systematic evaluations of the extent of state capture in the individual countries, and so without having a solid baseline, in the current portfolio review we do not aim at quantifying the extent to which our funding contributed to decreasing state capture. The criteria for success we use are:

- 1) Public awareness of the systemic nature of the problem and presence in the public domain and knowledge of illustrative cases of state capture;
- 2) Existence of opportunity⁸ for countering state capture, in terms of existence, structure, and strength of (or possibility to create) synergic ecosystems of actors to push for systematic political reform, as well as in terms of existence of functional partnerships and coordinating actors;
- 4) Political opportunity to set and advance the counter-state-capture agenda (existence of pro-reform political elite, or at least absence of strong anti-reform veto-players);
- 5) Match between the policy opportunity present, and the contribution delivered by think tanks with our support. This could be in the immediate policy research contribution to the coalition, or in the form of preparing building blocks for future use in coalitions.

We measure success also through the relevance and timeliness of the intellectual contributions or research findings our grantees provided in each specific country.

Based on these criteria we are able to categorize both the countries and the individual projects supported. We see positive developments in the Czech Republic and Romania, followed by Slovakia. Developments in Bulgaria and Hungary are less hopeful, with Hungary being currently the most challenging case for pursuing this type of reform. The “scouting” countries are countries where we have seen the need coupled with

⁵ See detailed list of three priorities with all six sub-priorities in the [call for proposals](#).

⁶ As specified in the list of the individual elements of the portfolio [document](#), we chose a cut-off point in 2012 (grant numbers OR2012 and following).

⁷ Consultancy was used to contribute to shaping discourse by hiring a journalist.

⁸ The existence of need for countering forms of state capture exists in a majority of countries.

emerging opportunities and have either attempted to provide support but the response was not sufficient (Slovenia, and Latvia few years ago), or where we are hoping to promote systemic governance reform but are too early in our efforts to evaluate impact (Croatia and Latvia after 2015). In terms of projects⁹ we have seen a spectrum ranging from full success, to missed chances, to contexts without opportunity.

Ranking the Cases

A) Trailblazers and Example-setters

We have observed success in terms of criteria of process and outcome in the Czech Republic, when our support to the Frank Bold Society¹⁰ contributed to countering state capture by building the knowledge base and awareness of the systemic nature of the problem, and to the emergence of a coalition and its healthy functioning and coordination. This paid off in action when grantees we supported were able to reach potential policymakers before the elections in 2013, which resulted in 166 out of the 200 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies signing a counter-state capture pledge consisting of adoption of nine specific anti-corruption laws.¹¹ In this case the match between the policy opportunity and the contribution think tanks delivered with our support was excellent.

The support we provided to Frank Bold delivered both the systematic analysis and the priority-setting, but the policy reform steps were advanced by one of the most inspiring counter-state capture coalitions in the region.¹² “Reconstructing the State” at its peak was an unprecedented pledge campaign pushing for reform of the captured state in Czech Republic, combining active citizens, more than 20 civil society organizations, renowned experts, members of the business community, business chambers and associations, and reform-minded politicians.

The complexity of state capture requires choosing a good set of “core” issues. Ideally, these should start with relatively low-hanging fruit, so that the initial interest in a systemic approach can be rewarded within a reasonable time period. At the same time, they need to target vulnerable pivots of the captured state governance system. The “Reconstructing the State” campaign managed to identify these fulcrums in its clear goal pushing for adoption of the specific anti-corruption laws. The number of requests reflects the local conditions and the level of ambition of those proposing it.

⁹ All of our support within this portfolio comes in the form of project grants with specific end-dates and deliverables, even though we provide ample flexibility to seize emerging opportunities. Given that we take these projects mainly as demonstration work, we end our funding when we see that the concept is rooted and actors are able to get additional support from different sources. For example, we have withdrawn from supporting procurement and transparency work in Slovakia (work of Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) and Transparency International Slovakia (TIS), although it is currently considered to be an example in Europe in efforts in procurement transparency, thanks to TTF’s and other OSF programs’ support to actors pushing these changes in 2010-2012. These efforts currently need more implementation than demonstration, so we have tied off our support.

Occasionally one project consists of multiple grants. This is the case either when we saw funding opportunities continuing during longer periods than initially foreseen in the project, such as with funding the [Frank Bold Society](#) in the Czech Republic, or the [Romanian Academic Society](#). Other examples include consortia of multiple organizations working on the same project, as was the case of Transparency International Hungary, Atlatszo.hu, K-Monitor, and Political Capital in Hungary on the project [“Civil society to counter local election fraud and state capture”](#).

¹⁰ The organization was formerly known as the Environmental Law Service, for consistency’s sake we refer to them by their new name.

¹¹ [Transparent financing of political parties](#), [Declarations of assets on taking up an office](#), [Contracts on the internet](#), [Abolition of anonymous shares](#), [Appointments to state companies’ boards](#), [Independent public administration](#), [No political interference in investigations](#), [Transparent legislative process](#), [Extension of the powers of the Supreme Audit Office](#)

¹² We started in 2010, when the organization was mainly an environmental watchdog, with project support to research governance abuses related to the state-owned energy company CEZ. The progress of the project followed opportunities in the Czech Republic, and transformed into a wide coalition, as Frank Bold took on more research and the coalition gathered together more actors. TTF’s specific contribution to forming a coalition can be traced to a lunch meeting in 2011 between Frank Bold and a number of smaller organizations (KohoVolit.eu, zIndex.cz and Nasipolitici.cz) who had all applied for project support, when we noticed there was good potential for cooperation and encouraged them to apply jointly.

The success of this campaign came about mainly because of the combination of opportunity that emerged in the Czech Republic and the intellectually rigorous contribution of a number of think tanks that worked with Frank Bold. The convening of the coalition took place with help from the US Embassy in Prague and Open Society Foundation Prague. Our support enabled Frank Bold not only to contribute to the design of the pledge including the nine laws,¹³ and rigorous policy research on specific policy recommendations, but also to coordinate forming and running the coalition.

The case of Romania can also be seen as a success. The support we provided mainly to the Romanian Academic Society (RAS) contributed to their forming of a “Coalition for Clean Romania.” RAS and its president Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (OSIFE Board Member) have become one of the leaders in the European scene analyzing accountability, corruption, and state capture. While claiming that we are responsible for this would be farfetched, our support enabled RAS to contribute to the Clean Romania Coalition with important policy products and knowledge of the systemic nature of state capture in Romania.

Unfortunately the ecosystem in Romania is much more fragmented and polarized, so we have not seen as wide cooperation as in the case of the Czech Republic. Nonetheless our support has enabled individual contributions in addition to RAS in the form of policy reform recommendations from the Association Institute for Public Policy, Median Research Centre (MRC), Expert Forum, and the Romanian Center for European Policies. In this way we have contributed to making the efforts at countering-state capture in Romania multi-polar. Even if full-scale collaboration among all actors does not yet seem possible, we see improved communication and limited coordination across the organizations on the most important subjects.

B) Followers

The success of the Czech coalition went “viral” and inspired organizations in other countries to at least think about systematic ways of countering state capture in their own countries. Two clear follow-up campaigns emerged in the region.

In Slovakia, SGI followed the example of “Reconstructing the State” closely, and designed a local equivalent in “The Good Candidates” ([Správni Kandidáti](#)). The pledges for individual candidates in Slovakia allowed for some flexibility (candidates did not have to sign up for all nine priorities). These pledges fell into three broader categories: procurement, public ownership, and provision of services;¹⁴ access to information, transparency, and improved communication;¹⁵ and the transparency of Council meetings.¹⁶

While we have had many successful individual projects in Slovakia, we have realized that a systematic approach to funding is needed. Therefore, simultaneously as we were discussing project support to Via Iuris for analysis of the system assuring impunity for captors of the state, we sought an independent local convener. The role of an independent convener that OSF Prague undertook in the Czech Republic could not have been implemented in Slovakia by the local OSF foundation, because of the difficult leadership transition and the different priorities of the previous executive director.

In order to provide for a local coordinator who would not have a conflict of interest either with the policy researchers or with the advocacy organizations, Andrej reached out to the Pontis Foundation, which had been running a corporate philanthropy operation “The Fund for Transparent Slovakia” that supported the very same organizations as we had within this portfolio. This meant Pontis was not perceived as a competitor, and at the same time had intimate knowledge of the organizations and their synergies and animosities. Thanks to

¹³ You can read more about the coalition [here](#) or at their [website](#).

¹⁴ Local government-owned enterprises and companies; effective public procurement; transparent HR selection processes; clear rules on the distribution of available capacities in housing, schools, kindergartens, senior houses and other services provided by local authorities.

¹⁵ Access to information about the economy; fair local media; and modern online communication between the municipality and citizens.

¹⁶ Opening up council and commission meetings to the public; and making the content of these meetings publicly available.

the cooperation between Via Iuris and Pontis Foundation a coalition started to emerge. The coalition consists of four organizations: Via Iuris, SGI, the Pontis Foundation, and Let's Stop Corruption foundation. Transparency International Slovakia, Fair Play Alliance, and INEKO are not formally part of the coalition, but they have agreed to informally coordinate their actions and advocacy with it. We consider this an emerging success in Slovakia that we will be able to learn even more from, and will evaluate it after the parliamentary elections in early 2016.

C) Missed Chances and Disappointments

A major disappointment in this portfolio has been support to Transparency International Hungary (TI-HU). In 2013, after three years of excellent cooperation with the organization, we thought we had found a partner who could spearhead Hungarian counter-state capture efforts. We awarded them a three-year grant, one of the longest programmatic support grants TTF has awarded in the EU. Our expectation was that TI-HU would use our support to capitalize on their previous efforts, extend their funding base, and lead intellectually in the systematic countering of particularism and state capture in Hungary. Unfortunately, the executive director of the organization departed to join academia, and her replacement had a different vision and different qualities. The executive director's departure was followed by the departure of a number of leading staff members and senior experts (two joined TI's headquarters in Berlin). The organization lost its intellectual drive, leadership, and creativity.

All this became visible with a networking and knowledge-exchange event that we initially aimed to support through a hands-off grant in 2013. In the absence of leadership from TI-HU, TTF staff (Andrej) had to step in, design the agenda of the meeting, and even take a hands-on approach to managing the event itself. We managed to limit the damage from that particular event, but the three-year grant commitment remained. While TI-HU delivered according to the grant contract, the quality was mediocre. We considered rescinding the grant, but in the dire situation of Hungarian civil society and TI-HU due to the government's policies we would have risked this being misunderstood, and could have added to the struggles of the civil society sector in Hungary. Thus we carried on, even if it meant additional staff time and delays in delivery during the first 18 months, after which project performance improved. This has been a significant lesson not only within this portfolio, reminding us that past performance is no guarantee of future success, especially if intellectual leadership depends disproportionately on a few individuals.

Less a disappointment and more a missed opportunity was the original Hungarian coalition modeled on the Czech example, in this case called "At a Minimum" ([Ez A minimum](#)). Unfortunately the pledge campaign with six groups of proposals¹⁷ failed to receive traction at the national level, mainly because what were called minimum requirements were presented vaguely yet extensively, and in a language that allowed the political majority to reject the reform proposal as being affiliated with the party opposition.¹⁸ Given that not only political representation is polarized according to political lines, but also civil society, an initiative coming from the left-liberal side of civil society without any representation from the center-right¹⁹ created an additional obstacle in reaching beyond the already persuaded. The organizations collaborating on the campaign (TI-HU, K-Monitor, Atlatzo.hu, and Political Capital) tried to revive it during the municipal elections following the example of Slovakia's "Good Candidates," and both make it less party-political and refocus it from the national to the municipal level, where more non-partisan candidates were running.

¹⁷ Including party financing, procurement transparency, nomination procedures and revolving door policies, state ownership policies and state-owned companies, legislative transparency, and rule of law.

¹⁸ The initial attempts at forming cooperation in Hungary emerged with the TTF's support already in 2008 (through project 'More Transparency and Accountability in Party and Political Campaign Financing' implemented jointly by Freedom House Europe & Transparency International Hungary, but with involvement of other organizations across the ideological spectrum.). While the 2008-2011 project was an example of wide, cross-partisan cooperation, and it could serve as an example of success, partly because of the general political situation, it has not been replicated or built upon since then. The first "Ez A Minimum" proposal for example called for reverting to the constitution of 2010, similarly worded requests were audible from the left-wing opposition.

¹⁹ Unlike in the original 2008-2011 work, when representation included also center-right organization (for example Nézőpont Intézet)

We provided support to these efforts in the form of [four contracts](#) to the founding organizations to monitor electoral irregularities and diagnose state capture at the municipal level. The wide(r) coalitions, including “At a Minimum” and the additional work on elections,²⁰ have fostered better cooperation. But unlike in the Czech case they have not managed to reach beyond the opposition (left-wing and liberal) side of the civil society. While the results at the municipal level were somewhat more promising, with more constructive relations especially with politically non-aligned counsellors and mayors, overall the results of our support in Hungary remain mixed.

A second major disappointment was in a contract we awarded to a journalist to cover a case of countering state capture in the Czech Republic through a number of different products that should have formed a package. The aim of the case study package was to allow organizations and individual stakeholders from other countries to learn from a specific experience in the Czech Republic, to assess the suitability of this approach, and possibly also to apply some of the tools and strategies to their national contexts.

The case study was to be written in a story-telling form and published in general interest media outlets. The sources of disappointment were two-fold: first, the contractor delivered the texts with significant delays; second, the organic placement of the articles did not proceed as expected, and he succeeded in having only one [article published](#) in *Newsweek* with a second article having been considered by *Foreign Policy*, which eventually went with a [different article](#) on the topic by different authors. Both of the texts were of good quality and written in a captivating manner. The multimedia material (interviews) was of acceptable quality, even if not in the form we expected (audio instead of video). Nonetheless, we had much higher hopes than what was delivered.

The lesson learned is that it is not feasible, or at least not likely, to hire a single provider to deliver multiple outputs (texts, data, and video). The second lesson is that having articles published in the international press is not something we can dictate, as the news cycle lives according to its own logic. Also it seems that the choice to hire a British journalist when targeting global audience was not the best, and we should have been more precise in our expectations for audience and geographic scope.

The objective we had of spreading the news about the counter-state capture coalition was partly achieved, because international media covered the story of the Czech Republic even if we did not pay for those texts.²¹ An academic unrelated to us produced a detailed [case study](#). What we could have done instead is support a researcher (whether through contract, competition, or as a TTF intern) in compiling the story of the coalition in the form of a case study that could be taken on by those interested in learning or replicating. TTF staff writing Open Society Voices blogs in combination with attending events where potential followers already are, or where donors potentially interested in supporting this work congregate, was much more effective in reaching the right audience with the right message.²²

Networking, Knowledge-sharing, and Experimenting

In addition to providing grants for projects, we have also supported the organization of two events.²³ The first was the knowledge-sharing event held by TI-HU, which taught us a hard lesson in the importance of organizational assessment as described in detail in the section on disappointments above. The exploratory workshop was supposed to center on transparency of state-owned enterprises, providing an opportunity for

²⁰ Support to Social Development Institute and Political Capital for the project “New electoral system in Hungary: watchdogging, advocacy and awareness-raising” from 2011-2014 (GT# 40020100 & OR2012-23284)

²¹ <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/czech-politics>; <http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/25252/czech-republic-ngos-anti-corruption-agenda>; <http://www.praguepost.com/czech-news/44192-european-report-slams-czechs-over-corruption>; <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/10/now-the-czechs-have-an-oligarch-problem-too-andrei-babis/>

²² The OS Voice piece explaining role of think tanks in countering state capture ranks 5th in Google results after Wikipedia, IMF and WorldBank, as audited by the [Search Engines Results Page](#) tool.

²³ We are in the middle of co-preparing a third one in December 2015.

networking and capacity-building, as well as experience in research methodology and advocacy. Due in no small part to TI-HU's management problems, however, attendance was low and the outputs were mediocre.

The second event we co-organized with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and their Middle East Center as an inter-regional experience and knowledge-sharing meeting on state capture October 20-21, 2014 in Istanbul. We focused on two sets of transitional countries (Central and Southeastern Europe and several countries of the Middle East and North Africa). The selected countries were not resource-rich, but they shared the characteristics that state capture is prevalent, undermines government legitimacy, and poses major obstacles to state reform. This cooperation worked very well,²⁴ with excellent follow-up and contribution to informing one of the seminal monographs on state capture and structural corruption, Sarah Chayes' *Thieves of State*. As a consequence, we have noticed greater interest in structural work on analysis of and countering state capture particularly in Southeastern Europe. Additionally, we have observed more desire for methodological rigor, as reflected in higher-quality proposals since the meeting.

In addition to these formal events, we have also experimented with approaches to scouting for new partners and projects. In order to provide country-focus and increase responses to calls for proposals, TTF Staff organized in-country meetings with prospective applicants.²⁵ Andrej organized a joint meeting with eight organizations in Slovakia (former and current grantees as well as three NGOs new to TTF) in late July 2014.²⁶ It was surprising to realize that for some of these attending organizations, such a meeting was the first opportunity they had had to learn what others in their own country were doing. It was shocking to discover that we as an external donor know these organizations and their activities, in much greater depth than they do for each other. In early August 2014, Andrej organized a similar meeting with Hungarian organizations that had approached TTF and OSIFE with suggestions to work on a number of relevant issues. That meeting was followed by cooperation between four organizations during the municipal elections (assessed and processed under the rapid response procedures). In late August 2014, Andrej together with Sanjukta organized two group meetings for ten organizations during their visit to Bucharest.²⁷ The fact that we had to organize two separate meetings is illustrative of the organizational and personal animosities in Romania, even if the partial overlap signals potential for cooperation.

We have also been active in showcasing the work of our grantees to the European Commission and fostering collaboration among several of our grantees to apply jointly for EC funding. We have built an informal but regular communication channel with DG Competition and DG Justice through which we showcase the work of our grantees and promote their expertise. When the European Commission announced a [funding opportunity](#) of up to EUR 6.2 million in November 2014 through its Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs we convened a series of discussions that resulted in six separate [consortia](#) applying for the EU money.²⁸

Of these six consortia, one of them received a grant of EUR 367,640 (\$412,475),²⁹ nearly equivalent to our annual grant budget within this portfolio (the 2015 budgeted amount for grants before internal reallocation was \$440,000). The winning consortium is a brand-new grouping that clearly formed as a result of our

²⁴ The only hiccup we experienced with the workshop was in terms of logistics. We had initially planned to hold it in Beirut, but the rapidly worsening security situation there forced us to move it to Istanbul.

²⁵ This was done partially as a consequence of the unexpectedly changed end-of year grant-making deadline in 2014, which was announced only two months in advance, and necessitated finding a new way of announcing this complex funding opportunity.

²⁶ Alliance Fair Play, INEKO, INESS, IVO, OZ Pod Povrchom, OZ Proti Korupcii, TI Slovakia, and Via Iuris.

²⁷ First hosted by SAR, where ProDOMO, Save Bucharest, Rise Project, Cartel Alfa Union, IPP, and CRPE participated, second hosted by CRPE, attended also by Freedom House, Median Research, Expert Forum.

²⁸ Five of the six consortia were led by organizations from Eastern Europe, four of them our current grantees, and a majority of members in all consortia are our current or past grantees. TTF has issued letters of support to all six consortia and offered to consider providing co-funding and join the consortium as associate partner if the winner is one of them.

²⁹ Consortium led by the Romanian Center for European Policies together with Expert Forum (RO), Romanian Center for European Policies (RO), Risk Monitor (BG); Amapola Progetti (IT), and Candole (CZ) for the project "SOeSC - State Owned Enterprises - Preventing Corruption and State Capture."

convening. There are two lessons from this experience. First, the funding opportunities from the EU appear on extremely short notice, and are highly competitive. Second, we can contribute to successful applications for external funding through our convening power and staff-time commitment³⁰ in ways that increase our impact beyond our budget.

Finally, we have also spread the word about our work and approaches tested by our grantees through numerous speaking opportunities and publications, including OS Voices pieces and advocacy meetings with other donors. While not easy to precisely quantify the impact, we have contributed to shaping the systematic understanding of governance problems in Europe. We have noticed an increased (or revived) use of the state capture concept, both in academic publications but also among some think tanks and watchdog organizations that previously called all of their work anti-corruption.

Conclusions and Lessons learned

During the development of this portfolio, we made a number of choices, some of which have proved right, and some of which we wish we had avoided. From these we have learned a number of lessons about our theory of change, our concept of state capture, and how a donor can and cannot support this work:

Conceptual Innovation: state capture vs. corruption

Our work in this portfolio has shown the need for greater conceptual clarity. While the foundations have been laid, and the basic interest and understanding of the need for conceptualization of this work as systemic phenomenon is not questioned as much as it used to be, we continue to see a need for developing a robust conceptual framework.

Particularism in governance and rent-seeking in public resource distribution are not illegal. It is therefore necessary to analyze state capture systemically, and understand how they differ from the conventional conception of corruption as an individual moral failure, and crime punishable under existing law.³¹ When dealing with state capture, focusing on accountability and anti-corruption is like battling the hydra: each time one of the heads is removed, another pops up. When transparency of state budgets became widespread, the unscrupulous principals of state capture adapted their modes of public resource extraction and focused on public procurement, PPPs, and state-owned companies. By refocusing the attention of organizations on understanding the issue not as the moral failure of an individual, or a criminal behavior, but as a governance design flaw in states, they are able to see when anti-corruption rhetoric is abused and the reform agenda hijacked by populists or even by captors themselves.

There is certainly more work still to be done in developing the conceptual framework, both intellectually and for practical purposes. Increasing knowledge of state capture in the public domain could lead to wider social support for counter-state capture coalition. But it also presents a challenge in form of potentially feeding anti-system populist political parties that attempt to adopt the anti-state capture agenda and feed anti-mainstream conspiracies. *Pro forma* reforms from mainly populist (and sometimes non-democratic) political forces are a new challenge. We see this unfolding in the Czech Republic and partly in Slovakia, but unfortunately, at this moment we do not have a satisfactory answer as to how our partners should cope with this challenge.

The comparative event we convened in Istanbul helped us and our partners to better understand different iterations and forms of state capture. Thanks to these discussions we have witnessed progress in development of an [analytical framework](#) that provides interested parties with a set of questions to start understanding the scale and type of state capture they face. Especially from our more recent discussions and application submissions, we have noticed great demand for streamlining the analytical framework and establishing a shared methodology for comparing countries, but also a common ground to share experience.

³⁰ During the discussion we realized that the demand for sharing experiences of countering state capture is very high, when we actually reached the technical limit of 25 participants with our videoconferencing provider, and some participants could not connect to the videoconference.

³¹ Often represented through the triangle of Motivation-Opportunity-Rationalization.

In addition to our work, there are parallel conceptual developments, such as those spearheaded by Alina Mungiu Pippidi, or Sara Cheyes, but they have their own logics, which are not primarily policy-oriented.³² The need for more systematic mapping across countries, to assess both the extent of state capture and its dynamic across time and space nonetheless persists.

Collaboration

Our work thus far has shown the importance of collaboration. Once vulnerabilities in the system of state capture are identified, the most effective way of pushing systemic reform can be through a synergistic collaboration of different actors. To build and maintain a wide coalition of supporters, anti-state capture governance reform proposals must be presented in non-partisan language. Coalitions that push these proposals require a coordinating actor who is not perceived as competing with the individual members of the coalition. A vibrant ecosystem is also crucial for comprehensive policy change. Partners must work on *both* research (diagnosis and design of the remedy), and on monitoring, watchdogging, activism and advocacy (delivering the cure), but also partners beyond civil society have to be involved. Some Czech businesses have been exemplary in this respect.” Finally, as domestic barriers to resource extraction increase and public oversight improves, captors develop new ways of avoiding public scrutiny and oversight, such as avoiding tracing beneficial ownership. To keep up with and counter this new development, a new level of cross-border cooperation is needed.

As one of the few donors in Europe with experience from multiple countries and who treats state capture as a systemic problem, we have noticed that there is a need to provide additional support for coordination of efforts and sharing of experiences. This can be done through international knowledge-sharing meetings, but we have learned that it is equally important to use our convening power as a donor to foster cooperation within countries, especially where there is no domestic convener. Virtual meetings can also contribute to such cooperation and can help in improving preparedness for funding opportunities.

Sustainability

Considering the long-term nature of addressing state capture and the capacity for adaptation of captors, sustainability—in terms of public attention and reform fatigue, but also in terms of funding—is a crucial issue. We conceived this portfolio on our own initiative and we do not expect to provide long-term support to the field. However, we have indirectly contributed to shaping of the field of anti-corruption, accountability and good governance. Through a diverse portfolio of grants, and our willingness to take risks in providing project support, we have set an example for other donors in how to take a more systemic approach.³³

The European Commission’s concomitant creation of a brand-new [funding line](#) that includes the concept of state capture in the sub-topics within the priorities for the Internal Security Fund Police cannot be directly attributed to our work, but we think that this is an example reflecting the larger change in the sector that we have contributed to.

Besides our strict project support, we have seen the necessity of having resources for coordination and convening in individual countries. TTF benefited from OSF’s flexibility in being able to provide this within its project grants. Given the resource intensity, we have also seen that we need to find ways of leveraging our support by providing flexible co-funding for larger but less flexible donors (such as EU).

Finally, in assessing the overall efforts in this portfolio, it is clear that there is a disproportionate relation between staff time and budget spent. While grants take a majority of the budget, much more time is spent on tasks that are not directly attributable to grants: scouting for new grantees, designing events and

³² See for instance the work of [Alina Mungiu-Pippidi](#) of Hertie School of Governance and European Research Center for Anti-Corruption and State Building, and [Sara Cheyes](#) at the Carnegie Endowment.

³³ Particularly [European Commission](#), [Porticus](#) (Vienna office), [Let’s Stop Corruption foundation](#), but also [Anticorruption Endowment](#) and [Orakar Motejl Fund](#).

consultancies, communicating, and advocating among other donors. We have learned that this disproportionality must be better reflected in our internal strategy planning cycle.

Future Outlook

In the last three years, through this work TTF learned a lot about supporting coalitions, about shaping the field of anti-corruption, accountability and good governance, and about selection of best instruments of support and actors. These will be the starting points adjusting and integrating similar work of OSIFE into a single consolidated portfolio in 2016 under the TTF's conceptual leadership.

TTF has worked with policy researchers mainly in Eastern Europe; OSIFE has funded European networks of NGOs, activists, and consumers in France, Greece, and Hungary. Together with the Justice Initiative it has also supported projects strengthening the litigation capacity of and collaboration among organizations that fight for victims of the financial crisis. We would like to continue exploring ways of using the strategic litigation and provisions for protecting consumer rights to counter regulatory capture, and seek ways of expanding its use in cases of state capture.³⁴

We plan to continue our role as a successful convener, conceptual innovator, coalition-builder and experimenter in the state capture field. Capitalizing on our experiences in Central and Eastern Europe, we will convene a meeting on state capture to nurture a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, share innovative approaches on countering it, facilitate cross-border cooperation, and foster coalitions between different stakeholders. We will extend the invitation to this meeting to actors from Western Europe (where we expect to see much more regulatory capture) and to several actors from Southeastern Europe in support of the work of our colleagues in TTF for Wider Europe.

Given the need we have observed for joint collaboration and coalition-building between policy researchers, civil society actors, and grassroots activists, we plan to capitalize on OSIFE's experience and continue strengthening coalitions at the national level and supporting specific national policy reforms. When complementary, we will encourage these coalitions to provide feedback to the EU level to close legislative loopholes and create policy windows for change. In this way we will combine TTF's experience working with policy researchers in Eastern Europe with OSIFE's experience working in Western Europe with grassroots activists and watchdogs.

Finally, we see a need for continuing the discussion about operationalizing anti-state capture work through an analytical or watchdog tool that would provide a deeper comparative approach across time and geographies. As a follow-up to our conceptual work,³⁵ by the end of 2016 we want to have explored the potential for and feasibility of an "EU State and Regulatory Capture Watch"³⁶ as an index or an early warning tool about sectors or institutions that are being captured in individual countries.

³⁴ Opportunities emerge, when financial transaction passes through non-captured jurisdiction, or involves companies subject to different jurisdictions. (We have seen cases involving investigations by Swiss authorities, or U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission but we have not yet investigated our possible support to this work.)

³⁵ We have already taken steps to support a meeting to take place in December and to support research into the feasibility of this index and complement it with a fellowship grant to support investigative journalism on this topic.

³⁶ We sense that there is a possibility of compiling a matrix of vulnerabilities of captured state, or requirements for avoiding systemic particularism in governance. Transparency International's [National Integrity Systems Assessment](#), the World Bank's Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey ([BEEPS](#)), the EU-funded [Anticorrupt](#) consortium, or Corruption Research Center Budapest's Corruption Risk Index ([CRI](#)) are all inspiring examples. Unfortunately, while these all are important contributions, their objectives target different audiences and do not provide all the elements that we see practitioners as needing to counter state capture.

Annex

Portfolio Elements (as submitted on September 18, 2015)

This portfolio is built upon a legacy of support that began in November 2006,³⁷ but we present for review activities starting in 2012. We chose this cut-off point mainly because the work that preceded and lead to the creation of this portfolio was reviewed at the TTF Sub-Board meeting on October 27, 2011.³⁸ The current portfolio was formed based on those discussions, and it was further streamlined into the TTF Strategy for 2014-17. In line with the strategy a fully separate portfolio, budget, and a category of work under the Level 3 Program name of “[2B Countering State Capture](#)” identical with the category of work “CTI002-THINK TANK FUND: Support demonstration projects [Countering State Capture]” was formed.

The total size of the portfolio since 2012 (grant numbers OR2012 and following) is \$2,260,093. The portfolio includes 1) organizational project grants (\$2,221,879); 2) networking and knowledge-exchange activities consisting of two events supported by TTF (\$28,598), and convening and support of consortia applying for external funding; and 3) shaping discourse through staff-authored and contracted external publications (\$9,616),³⁹ and participation of TTF staff at external events.

This elements document contains the full portfolio since 2012. Given that the number of elements is over three dozen, to highlight the patterns and lessons learned in the review document itself we will focus our analysis on a country case selection consisting of work in five countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Through this selection, we aim to illustrate the patterns in choices we made and developments we observed.

1. Organizational Project Grants⁴⁰

The active portfolio consists of 24 projects through 30⁴¹ grants within the current Strategy Cycle (since 1/2012 (OR2012->), \$2,221,879): <https://myapplications.my.salesforce.com/00Od0000004Jywk42>

2. TTF Supported Networking and Knowledge Exchange:

Transparency and Disclosure Requirements for State Owned Enterprises – Exploratory Workshop, July 24, 2013 in Budapest, (\$9,156 [grant](#))

Workshop on Comparing and Addressing State Capture, October 20-21, 2014 in Istanbul (\$13,828 [grant](#) + event code [AE035] consultancy covering airfare \$5,614⁴³)

Convening series of virtual discussions to facilitate forming consortia applying for the funding opportunity at European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs. (EC Funding line of up to EUR 6.2 million).⁴⁴ We fostered collaboration among several of our grantees to apply jointly for

³⁷ As part of the “Open Society New Response” project portfolio.

³⁸ Details of the 2011 portfolio review write-up are in the [Board Memorandum document](#) pages 41-50, [minutes](#) of that meeting pages 11-13, and the accompanying [background analysis](#).

³⁹ Consultancy was used to contribute to shaping discourse through hiring a journalist.

⁴⁰ Call for Proposals is available [here](#).

⁴¹ We are including also the eight most current project (started this summer) but we are assessing only their inclusion and thematic fit on our (the donor) side, not their performance. The co-funded grant OR2014-16365 to Pazmany Peter Catholic University which is administered by OSIFE Hungary Project is not included in this portfolio assessment even if it appears in the report.

⁴² Built on legacy of 19 projects through 24 grants within topical fit (2007-2012 (OR2007-OR2011), \$ 1,507,349; [FC report](#)).

⁴³ The entire costs of the event were higher than expected because initially the workshop should have taken place in Beirut, but because of security concerns we had to move the workshop to Istanbul, resulting in additional costs for unused airfare. Details are [available here](#).

⁴⁴ Internal Security Fund Police (2014-2020) Call For Proposals – HOME/2014/ISFP/AG/EFCE Economic and Financial Crime, Corruption and Environmental Crime http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/internal-security-fund-police/calls/2014/ispf-ag-efce/index_en.htm

European Commission funding, and out of the six consortia that resulted from our efforts, one was awarded a grant of EUR 367,640 (\$412,475).

3. Shaping discourse

Open Society Voices (staff authored):

[Can a Think Tank Help Expose a Captured State?](#), OS Voice, November 5, 2014, Andrej Nosko

[In Leviathan, a World Governed by Unwritten Rules](#), OS Voice, February 23, 2015, Goran Buldioski

Open Society Voices (featuring grantees):

[Once Riddled with Corruption, Slovakia Sets a New Standard for Transparency](#), June 2, 2015, (TIS Gabriel Šipoš)

[Putting Transparency into Practice in Slovakia: What We Can Learn](#), July 6, 2012, (TIS/Eleanor Kelly)

[Knowing Your City's Finances Can Bring Real Change](#), October 19, 2012 (INEKO/Peter Goliaš)

Consultancy:

Documenting a Countering State-Capture Case Study by a Journalist; Contract: #8008860, \$9,616 (\$7,200 fees+\$2,416 additional costs) Article [link](#). Multimedia [support materials](#).

External Events (not funded by TTF):

Panelist contribution (Andrej Nosko): Citizens lobbying for reforms - Lessons from the “reconstruction” movements in CEE, [Forum 2000 Conference](#), September 14, 2015, Prague, Czech Republic.

Understanding Governance Virtuous Circles, [Who Succeeded and Why?](#), July 8-12, 2015, Berlin, Germany. (ANTICORRP conference attendance)

Panelist contribution (Andrej Nosko): “[Energy Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the Operations of Russian State-Owned Energy Enterprises](#)” June 22, 2015, Prague

Panelist contribution (Andrej Nosko) Identifying Energy Governance Deficits: Tackling Corruption and State Capture Risks, SELDI Policy Advocacy Workshop: [Countering Corruption and State Capture for Transparent Energy Governance in SEE](#), April 28, 2015, Belgrade, Serbia.



Panelist contribution (Andrej Nosko): “Energy Security and State Capture Risks in Europe: Measuring and Governance” panel at [Energy Security and State Capture Risks in Europe conference](#), October 27, 2014, Sofia, Bulgaria.

Active Organizational Project Grants Portfolio (by performance)



Clus	Perf	Legal	Grantee: Organization Name	Grant Numl	Proposal Name	Start Dat	End Date	Amount
BG-2b	↑ 5	Bulgaria	RiskMonitor Foundation	OR2013-11524	Towards a New Model for the Ministry of In	2/1/2014	10/31/2015	\$79,408
CZ-1	↑ 5	Czech Re	Frank Bold Society	OR2014-18079	Final Year of Reconstruction of the State:Adv	1/1/2015	4/30/2016	\$68,258
CZ-1	↑ 5	Czech Re	Frank Bold Society	OR2012-22139	State-Owned Enterprises, dientele networks a	5/1/2012	4/30/2013	\$68,153
CZ-1	↑ 5	Czech Re	Frank Bold Society	OR2013-05340	State-Owned Enterprises, dientele networks a	8/15/2013	8/15/2014	\$68,153
SK-1	↑ 5	Slovak Re	VIA IURIS	OR2014-16581	Opposing State Capture in Slovakia	11/1/2014	11/1/2016	\$125,000
SK-1a	↑ 5	Slovak Re	Pontis Foundation	OR2014-18093	Empowering Analytical and Watchdog Orgar	12/1/2014	6/30/2016	\$25,000
SK-1aa	↑ 5	Slovak Re	Transparency International Slovakia	OR2014-16582	Impact study of Introducing Open Contracti	10/1/2014	2/28/2015	\$4,000
SK-2	↑ 5	Slovak Re	Transparency International Slovakia	OR2013-02824	Making State-owned companies more transpa	6/1/2013	10/1/2015	\$149,868
BG-1a	↔ 4	Bulgaria	Center for the Study of Democracy	OR2012-23207	Enhancing Transparent Governance of Energ	12/1/2012	2/28/2015	\$130,000
RO-1	↔ 4	Romania	Romanian Academic Society (SAR)	OR2013-07392	Capturing the Populist Agenda	11/1/2013	5/1/2015	\$112,432
RO-2a	↔ 4	Romania	Expert Forum	OR2013-07397	Populism is not destiny: the populist capture	12/1/2013	2/28/2015	\$45,000
RO-2c	↔ 4	Romania	Median Research Centre (MRC)	OR2013-02821	Open the political process! Building citizen d	5/1/2013	11/2/2015	\$95,000
RO-2d	↔ 4	Romania	Association Institute for Public Polic	OR2014-18074	Money vs. Beauty: A Political Saga of State Ca	1/5/2015	11/5/2015	\$33,550
SK-1	↔ 4	Slovak Re	VIA IURIS	OR2012-00965	Windows to Judiciary year2	12/1/2012	12/1/2013	\$55,000
SK-1b	↔ 4	Slovak Re	Slovak Governance Institute (SGI)	OR2014-17280	Local Election 2014 - A Chance for Change in	10/1/2014	1/1/2016	\$30,136
BG-2a	↔ 3	Bulgaria	Center for the Study of Democracy	OR2014-14659	The media as an instrument for state capture	9/1/2014	3/1/2016	\$70,000
HU-2	↔ 3	Hungary	Atlatszo.hu Kozhasznu Nonprofit	OR2014-16258	Civil society to counter local election fraud and	9/1/2014	11/30/2015	\$34,240
HU-2	↔ 3	Hungary	K-Monitor Association	OR2014-16261	Civil society to counter local election fraud and	9/1/2014	11/30/2015	\$27,030
HU-2	↔ 3	Hungary	Political Capital Kft.	OR2014-16262	Civil society to counter local election fraud and	9/1/2014	11/30/2015	\$28,678
HU-2	↔ 3	Hungary	Transparency International Magyaro	OR2014-16255	Civil society to counter local election fraud and	9/1/2014	11/30/2015	\$52,439
SI-1	↔ 3	Slovenia	Transparency International Slovenia	OR2012-23218	Shining a Light on Money in Politics	12/1/2012	12/31/2014	\$100,000
HU-1a	↓ 2	Hungary	Transparency International Magyaro	OR2012-23216	Transparency and Disdosure Requirements fo	2/1/2013	1/31/2016	\$179,965
BG-1b	Just s	Bulgaria	RiskMonitor Foundation	OR2015-19497	EN-CAPTURE: Countering State Capture in	6/1/2015	6/1/2017	\$121,221
BG-1c	Just s	Bulgaria	Centre for Liberal Strategies	OR2015-19230	More complex than you think: spotlight on t	7/1/2015	7/1/2017	\$40,000
HR-1	Just s	Croatia/H	GONG	OR2015-19715	Understanding and Challenging Local State C	9/1/2015	3/1/2017	\$80,000
EU-1	Just s	Czech Re	Counter Balance	OR2015-19724	Countering the capture of European Public F	7/1/2015	12/31/2016	\$90,000
HU-1b	Just s	Hungary	Energiaklub Szakpolitikai Intezet es	OR2015-18497	Countering State Capture by Strengthening C	7/1/2015	7/1/2017	\$100,000
LV-1	Just s	Latvia	Centre for Public Policy, PROVIDUS	OR2015-19233	Analyzing signs of state capture: the case of L	7/1/2015	7/1/2017	\$95,000
RO-2b	Just s	Romania	Expert Forum	OR2015-19056	Keep an eye on your government ? enhancing	7/1/2015	1/1/2017	\$74,867
RO-1	Just s	Romania	Romanian Center for European Poli	OR2015-20010	Consolidating the Clean Justice Initiative Coa	7/1/2015	1/1/2017	\$39,481



EVENT ↑	United St	Carnegie Endowment fo	OR2014-15619	Workshop on Comp	9/1/2014	12/1/2014	\$13,828
EVENT ↘	Hungary	Transparency Internation	OR2013-03986	Transparency and Disc	4/15/2013	7/31/2013	\$9,156
EVENT Consultancy	90003825 OSI/TTF Events-300 Total			62010 Airfare			\$5,614
CONSULTANCY	80008860 Individual Andrew C. Contract						\$9,616

Portfolio Elements Visual Overview




TTF 2B: Countering State Capture Portfolio







TTF 2B: Countering State Capture Portfolio (Timeline since 2013)




Legacy Grants leading into TTF 2B Portfolio (Timeline until 2013)




Portfolio Elements Visual Overview



Schematic Chart of State Capture Elements Emerging From the Portfolio




Shaping discourse



<https://www.google.com/trends/explore?q=%22State%20Capture%22>

Google books Ngram Viewer



https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=state+capture&case_insensitive=on&year_start=1994&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=1&share=&direct_url=t4%3B%2Cstate%20capture%3B%2Cc0%3B%2Cs0%3B%3Bstate%20capture%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BState%20Capture%3B%2Cc0%3B%3BState%20capture%3B%2Cc0

Keyword	state capture
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	URL
1	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_capture
2	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_capture
3	http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/hellman.htm
4	http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-2444
5	https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/can-think-tank-help-expose-...
6	http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/state_capture_an_overview
7	https://www.ualberta.ca/~cius/stasiuk/st-pdf/Explaining%20State%20Capture...
8	http://corruptionresearchnetwork.org/acrn-news/blog/from-corruption-to-st...
9	http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221446
10	http://www.britannica.com/topic/state-capture

SERP ranking for "State Capture"⁴⁵ https://serps.com/tools/rank_checker_report/c3RhdGUyZFdwdHVyZWdvd2dsZXl2ZW4tdXM=

⁴⁵ A search engine results page (SERP) is the listing of results returned by a search engine in response to a keyword query.