The Economic Representation Deficit

Reconsidering economic policy congruence between voters and parties

Simon Otjes Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties Groningen University

Date: November 12, 2013 Version: 1.1

Abstract

The argument of this paper is that European voters and politicians have diverging views about economic issues. It is not just that politicians and voters *disagree* about economic matters (Costello, Thomassen, & Rosema, 2012), their understanding of this issue is different. Where party politicians understand economic issues in terms of a one-dimensional economic left-right dimension, which integrates questions of redistribution and government intervention, the economic views of citizens cannot be integrated into a left-right dimension. This paper shows that this difference in dimensionality has implications for the quality of representation in Europe: party politicians cannot provide adequate representation for their own voters.

Key words: representation; dimensionality; party space; voter space

1. Introduction¹

Since 2008 Europe has seen a permanent banking, economic and budgetary crisis. Politicians have offered different solutions for this crisis. Right-wing politicians, like German chancellor Angela Merkel, have argued for austerity policies. Left-wing politicians, like French president François Hollande, have campaigned on the promise of higher taxes for the rich and continued government spending. In the upcoming 2014 European Parliament elections parties of the left and the right will undoubtedly campaign on their different solutions to the economic crisis.

The economic left-right dimension has been quite persistent at the level of the political elite (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Budge & Robertson, 1987; Hix & Noury, 2009). There is growing evidence, however, that voters do not think in these simple left-right terms (Achterberg, Houtman, & Derks, 2011; Derks, 2004, 2006; Goerres & Prinzen, 2011; Otjes, 2013). Voters' views are far more diverse: issues like redistribution, nationalisation, support for free enterprise and government intervention in the economy do not fit into a simple left-right dichotomy.

A single left-right dimension is an important precondition for congruence between the views of citizens and the political elite (Costello et al., 2012; Downs, 1957; Thomassen, 1999). If the structures underlying politicians' and voters' preferences are very different, there can be no congruence between the policy preferences of the electorate and the parties: because there are no parties catering to the preferences of citizens that do not fit in the structure underlying the opinions of politicians.² This article seeks to test whether the structure underlying the views of European voters and parties on economic matters is the same. If the policy positions of politicians on economic matters can be modelled in terms of a single dimension and the ideal points of voters on economic matters cannot, this undermines the quality of democratic representation.

This article looks specifically at the policy preferences of candidates for the European Parliament and the ideal points of their voters in the European Parliament elections on economic matters. This is particularly relevant, because the bulk of the work of the European Parliament is economic nature and because of the ongoing

¹ The author wants to thank Rory Costello for sharing his replication data and code and Matthijs Rooduijn for his assistance with confirmatory factor analysis in Stata. ² 'Inconsistent' is not meant as a moral judgment of the views of citizens, but as a methodological assessment.

economic crisis, economic questions have become even more central to the European political agenda.

The thesis of this paper stands in contrast to a recent paper by Costello et al. (2012). Their study uses the same data and one of the methods employed here, but answers a different question; they test whether a three-dimensional European political space (with an economic, cultural and European dimension) fits the answers of citizens and whether politicians and citizens stand close to eachother on these dimensions. They determine that voters and politicians stand *closest* to each other on the economic dimension. On questions like EU integration and cultural issues, they found that citizens and their political representatives stood further apart. Their model includes controls for acquiescence bias. We do not think that this is the reason for the lack of coherence. And even if it is, acquiescence bias is an expression of a lack of coherence at the level of the citizens. This article will spend special attention on the theory and method of their paper.

This paper will have the following structure: first, the theory section will show the importance of the assumption that voters' views and politicians' views have the same structure for the theory of representation. Next, the method section will discuss techniques assessing the dimensional structure underlying the view of respondents. In order to ensure that the findings presented here are not the result of some methodological fluke different techniques will be employed. Then, the results sections will show how the structure between the views of voters and politicians differs and what that means for policy congruence. The conclusion sketches an agenda for further research.

2. Left, Right and Representation

A key model in the literature of representative democracy is the Responsible Party Model (APSA, 1950; Thomassen, 1999).³ In this model, elections function as instruments to link citizens' policy preferences to the policy positions of their representatives (Costello et al., 2012; Thomassen, 1999). For this model to function three conditions must be met: first, on the supply side of politics, parties differentiate themselves by offering different bundles of policies; second, on the demand side of

³ The word responsible in this model is quite confusing as in the literature this element can rather be described as 'responsive'

politics, voters much choose between parties on basis of their preferences for these policies (Thomassen, 1999). Third, parties' and voters' positions must be structured a single common policy dimension. For representation, party programs, the actions of members of parliaments and the views of voters should be constrained by the same dimension (Costello et al., 2012; Downs, 1957; Thomassen, 1999). The reason for this is that parties offer bundles of policies: one party may favour liberalizing markets and lowering taxes in order to create a better climate for enterprises to thrive; another party may favour nationalising public transport and increasing taxes in order to ensure that citizens have equal access to services. By voting for one party voters get the whole bundle (Costello et al., 2012; Thomassen, 1999). In order to assure that the bundle of policies does not contain policies that the voter opposes, there must be a common policy dimension that structures the positions of parties and voters.

2.1 Economic left and right

The structure of the party space may not necessarily match the structure of the voter space (Kriesi, 2010; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). If the way in which voter positions on different issues relate to each other differs markedly from the way in which party positions relate to each other, a significant segment of the voters cannot be represented: citizens who believe that their personal benefit is best served if the government nationalises public transport, but also desire to pay lower taxes, cannot be represented by parties that offer either lower taxes and privatization and higher taxes and nationalisation.

The academic debate on which dimensions structure the voter and the party space has gone on for a while. A key question is the extent to which a single left-right dimension, rooted in economic decision-making suffices to understand voting and political decision-making. Some argue that the left-right economic dimension is 'a superissue' which includes all these issues or pushes other issues off the political agenda (Inglehart, 1984; Mair, 2007). Other authors have argued that alternative dimensions are necessary. These include religious morality, the environment, immigration, European integration and law and order (Costello et al., 2012; Evans, Heath, & Lalljee, 1996; Evans & Heath, 1995; Gabel & Anderson, 2002; Heath, Evans, & Martin, 1994; Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002; Inglehart, 1984; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008; Lipset, 1960).

The question is not only which dimensions structure the political space, but also whether the dimensions that structure the voter and the party space are the same. Kriesi et al. (2008) and Costello et al. (2012) found that all over Europe voters and parties can be placed in a common space. Dimensions that concern economic, cultural and European issues structure this space. In contrast, Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009; Van der brug, 2008) problematise the notion of a common space in which voters and parties position themselves: they find that a one-dimensional solution suffices for the party space, while a multidimensional solution is necessary for the voter party: the left-right dimension structures party positions, while among citizens positions on cultural and economic issues are independent from each other.

This paper moves away from the ambition to build a comprehensive model of voter and party spaces and focuses on the dimensionality of one issue: the economy. The economic dimension is key for understanding of politics: most political decision-making concerns economic questions. One famous definition of politics itself sees it as the way society answers the question 'who gets what when and how?' (Laswell, 1936). In the classical models of democracy as those of Downs (1957) economic decision-making (and specifically the role of the government in the economy), is seen as the overarching political question.

In the literature there is broad agreement that the economic dimension concerns two different elements (Bobbio, 1996; Costello et al., 2012; Downs, 1957; Knutsen & Kumlin, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2008; Lipset, Lazerfeld, Barton, & Linz, 1954): the extent to which one prefers government intervention in the economy to the free market principle of laissez-faire (*economic interventionism*); and the extent to which one prefers redistribution of income in the interest of the less well of (*economic egalitarianism*). In general, leftwing voters and parties are assumed to favour government intervention, income redistribution, nationalisation, higher taxes and generous welfare state benefits. Rightwing voters and parties are assumed to favour free markets, income inequality, privatisation, lower taxes and limited welfare state benefits.

2.2 Voters and representatives

On basis of the existing literature one may expect that politicians have coherent views about economic matters. Evidence shows that certainly on economic

questions the left-right dimension is strong and persistent: in terms of the views of parties expressed in party manifestos (Budge & Robertson, 1987), their ideal positions according to expert surveys (Benoit & Laver, 2006) and party preferences expressed in the European Parliament (Hix & Noury, 2009).

Why does the left-right dimension constrain party positions on economic issues? Parties have to balance two different values when taking positions: responsibility and representation (Mair, 2009). Representation is a core notion of the 'responsible' party model: parties take into account the views of citizens when positioning themselves on issues. Political parties, however, are also responsible for the economic policies of the government: responsible policy is prudent and consistent (Mair, 2009). While Mair (2009) argues that prudence and consistency may limit the range of positions parties can take, this article argues that responsibility may limit the combinations of positions parties can take. Economic issues come with their own particular 'logical' constraints (Milyo, 2000). Preferences about economic policies are not primitive or independent but they cohere logically (Milyo, 2000): the size of the public sector (one element of the economic left-right dimension) has implications for taxes, prices and incomes (another element of the economic left-right dimension). If a party has a preference for a more equal income distribution, this requires more government intervention. Politicians are unlikely to have logically unconstrained policy preferences because they are conscious of the relationship between economic policies and as responsible politicians they will not favour inconsistent policies.

At the level of the citizen these constraints are weaker: Converse (1964) already observed that in the United States a large share of the electorate simply does not have meaningful beliefs, not even on questions that have been prominent in the political debate. Converse's finding concerned the United States in the 1960s, but his findings have been extended to other countries and more recent time periods (Butler & Stokes, 1974; Zaller, 1992). The economy may be a particularly 'hard' issue for citizens (Carmines & Stimson, 1980): many economic measures are technical. The relationship between ends and means are often not apparent. Recent literature on public opinion has shown that a large share of citizens has views on economic matters that are inconsistent from the perspective of single left-right dimension (Achterberg et al., 2011; Derks, 2004, 2006; Goerres & Prinzen, 2011; Otjes, 2013). This pattern has been shown in different countries, different studies, for general economic issues and

specific questions about the welfare state and using different methods of measuring scale quality.

Earlier studies have treated the lack of coherence in the views of citizens as a measurement problem (Wagner & Kritzinger, 2012; Walczak, Van der Brug, & de Vries, 2012) or a country-specific anomaly (Sperber, 2010). Costello et al. (2012), for instance attribute the lack of coherence in the views of citizens to acquiescence bias. They control for the fact that citizens with weak opinions tend to answer questions affirmatively independent of the questions. By controlling for acquiescence bias, Costello et al. (2012) smooth out the research problem of this paper. From the perspective of democratic representation, the difference in the coherence between citizens and politicians is a key theoretical problem. On issues where the structure that underlies party positions and voter positions differs 'elections are doomed to fail as an instrument of linkage with regards to those issues' (Costello et al., 2012). This leads to the following hypothesis, which will be tested in the remainder of this paper:

The economic views of politicians better fit into a single-dimensional left-right model than the views of citizens about the same subject.

3. Methods

The key assumption of spatial models is that respondents do not choose their positions at random. There is an underlying low-dimensional structure that cannot be observed directly. Methods of data reduction move from observed items to this latent structure. It is important to note that this process is a process of creation. Researchers choose particular observations and specific measurement models (Coombs, 1964). Each method comes with its own advantages, drawbacks, assumptions, options and diagnostics. Therefore, it may be that studies with different methods, that seek to answer dissimilar questions, come to divergent conclusions about the dimensionality of the political space. In order to ensure that the results presented here are not the result of some specific method, the results will be crossvalidated using three methods.

3.1 Methods of data reduction

There are two families of methods of data reduction: item response theory and classical test theory. The methods of classical test theory, such as Cronbach's α ,

confirmatory factor analysis, essentially, build further on correlation. Cronbach's α measures the reliability ('internal consistency') of a scale (Cronbach, 1951). This is operationalised as the correlation between the items in the scale and the latent dimension. Reliability is a pre-condition for unidimensionality, but not a sufficient condition (Cortina, 1993). Factor analysis can be applied in an exploratory and a confirmatory way (Brown, 2006). Confirmatory factor analysis will be employed here, because the goal is to *test* whether the positions of voters on a range of economic issues can be understood in terms of one dimension. Data must meet the assumptions of correlation for use in these classical test theory methods; these assumptions include a normal distribution and a linear relation between the items. If the data does not conform to these assumptions, classical test theory methods can lead to unexpected results (Van Schuur & Kiers, 1994). One drawback of structural equation modelling is that models sometimes do not converge (Brown, 2006): this is a sign of poor specification. The number of cases may be too low, making the result sensitive to outliers. The data may not fit the assumptions; it may not be normally distributed or categorical. The model may also be too complicated for the data. Brown (2006) advises users to see non-convergence as a substantial outcome.⁴

Mokken scaling is used as well. This is a method from the item response theory family (Van Schuur, 2003). This method has fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data. The method was developed for educational tests. The Mokken scaling algorithm builds a structure that ranges from items that most respondents correctly answer ('easy items') to items which least respondents give the correct answer ('difficult items'). A scale is consistent if a one-dimensional structure underlies these answers. The extent to which answers follow a one-dimensional structure is expressed in terms of the number of errors that are made: respondents that answer easy questions wrong and difficult answers correctly. As the items are not dichotomous but ordinal, polychotomous Mokken scaling will be employed.

These methods come with their own diagnostic statistics of model quality. The H-value of Mokken scaling and the eponymous Cronbach's α are the single diagnostic statistics of these methods. An α value above 0.5 indicates acceptable levels of internal consistency (Kline, 1999). The H-value has a threshold level of 0.3 (Mokken,

⁴ Given the high number of models, we are not going to delve into every instance of non-convergence.

1971). Confirmatory factor analysis has a number of goodness or badness of fit measures: the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). The RMSEA and the SRMR are acceptable when they are smaller than 0.08 and the CFI is acceptable if it is larger than 0.9 (Brown, 2006).

Costello et al. (2012) produce CFA models with controls for acquiescence bias. The theory section already discussed the substantive reasons for not including acquiescence bias controls. Appendix 1 will show that a control for acquiescence bias does not solve all the problems with scaling.

3.2 Data Sources

This article analyses whether the positions of citizens and voters on economic questions can be understood in terms of single dimensional model. The 2009 European Elections Survey (EES) and the 2009 European Elections Candidate Survey (EECS) will be employed (Giebler, Haus, & Weßels, 2010; Van Egmond, Sapir, Van der Brug, Hobolt, & Franklin, 2010). Voters and candidates were asked to answer the same opinion questions. This allows one to compare the extent to which their views cohere. The EES was held in all EU member states for the 2009 European Parliament election. A thousand voters were sampled in each country. For the EECS all candidate MEPs were asked to answer a questionnaire. The response rates differed strongly, as can be seen in Table 1. Candidates and citizens will be analysed separately. Only models with 20 or more respondents will be presented given how especially Confirmatory Factor Analysis is sensitive to the number of respondents (Brown, 2006). This means that candidate surveys from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia will be excluded. However, below 40 cases non-convergence may still be the result of a low N instead of model misspecification. All the items used in the main text are listed in Table 2. Respondents with missing items were deleted list-wise per analysis. All items have been recalculated so that they are in a left to right conceptual direction.

4. Scaling Results

The following sections look at the results of the different scaling methods. Table 3 and 4 present the H-values of Mokken scaling, the Cronbach's α -values,

RMSEA, CFI and SRMR for voters and politicians. Moreover, the factor loadings for the state, egalitarianism, enterprise and interventionism variables are presented. These are important, because confirmatory factor analysis does not test the assumption that relationships are in a particular direction, while the two methods do. So results can show a good fit in confirmatory factor analysis, even when the relationships go in against the expected direction.

According to the H-levels in none of the 27 EU member states, the four economic items fit in an ordinal order: in no country the threshold level of 0.3 is met. The best results are in Germany and Austria. The worst result can be found in Belgium, the negative score here indicates that one of the items may be strongly negatively related to the others. The H-values for the elite-level provide more justification for a single dimensional interpretation. In 80% of the countries, the views of politicians meet this basic requirement for a single-dimensional interpretation. When comparing the H-levels of the mass and elite-level one can see that the former are consistently lower than the latter. The average difference in the H-values between elite and mass is 0.35, which reflects the fact that among voters the H-values are all insufficient, while at the elite-level they tend to be sufficient. These results are in line with the expectation that voters have less consistent views than parties.

The α -values reflect a similar discrepancy between voters and politicians. For voters the Cronbach's α -values are insufficient in all but one country (Austria) although the value borders on acceptable for Germany. At the elite-level the values are sufficient in all but two countries (Latvia and Slovenia). This means that among voters the economic left-right dimension cannot be reliable measured by means of these four items, while it can be reliably measured at the level of the candidate. The average difference between the two values is 0.46. Again, these results sustain the hypothesis.

For the confirmatory factor analysis the results are more complicated, because there are three different indicators of model fit and the results also have to be in the correct direction. Table 3 shows the results of twenty-seven confirmatory factor analyses at the voter level. Six of them failed to converge. In none of countries, all three indicators of model quality give positive results: in two countries, only the RMSEA is above the threshold level; in eight countries, only the CFI levels are below the threshold levels. In the remaining eleven countries, both the CFI and RMSEA

levels are not met. Each model meets the required levels of the SRMR. When in all but three countries (Austria, Germany and France) the factor loadings are either they are statistically indistinguishable from zero (i.e. there is no relationship) or go in against the left-right dimension. For the state-item the factor loadings for two countries are indistinguishable from zero. The factor loadings for egalitarianism of three countries are indistinguishable from zero. When it comes to the enterprise variable, the problems become more pressing: for three countries the factor loadings are significantly in the wrong direction. This means that in these countries those who favour free enterprise more often than not also favour nationalisation of economic sectors. In another seven countries, the variables are indistinguishable from zero. This means that for just over half of the countries, the factor loading for enterprise is significant and in the correct direction. For the interventionism item, however, the problems are even larger: in six countries the value is indistinguishable from zero. In another eleven countries the relationship is significant, but in the incorrect direction: those who favour an equal distribution of incomes more often than not want less government intervention. This leaves only four countries, where the factor loading is significant and in the correct direction. All in all, the confirmatory factor analyses indicate that for no country the four-item economic model fits a one-dimensional model.

At the candidate level, nineteen models were ran and converged. In four countries, the four-item model did not converge. All these countries have less than 40 cases. Where the model was run, many indicators of model fit showed (near) perfect results. In 94% of the models, the SRMR was sufficiently high. In 81% of the countries, the value of the CFI met the threshold. In 68% of the models, the RMSEA was sufficiently high. The problems were concentrated in the same countries. This means that in two-third of the countries, the views of voters can be scaled in terms of one-dimension. In a small number of countries the confidence intervals on the factor loadings are so large that one cannot distinguish them from zero. These problems are concentrated in six countries, that all had forty or less respondents. They are not structurally related to one item.

All in all, in each of the factor analyses, the results at the voter level and the results at the candidate level stand in contrast. In no country, can the views of citizens on economic matters be scale into a single dimensional interpretation. At the same the

views of candidates for public office in a majority of countries meet all these requirements. This provides ample evidence for the hypothesis that voter views are less single-dimensional than views of politicians.

While comparing the results in table 3 and 4, one can see that overall, the onedimensional model shows consistently better fit for the candidate-level data than for the voter-level data. In six countries, candidates have better scores on all indicators of scale quality, including significantly higher factor loadings. This includes two countries where the factor analytical models *did* converge at the candidate-level where they did not at the voter level. In seven countries, candidates have better scores of scale quality but score equally well on one or two factor loadings in the CFA. In two additional countries, the H and α -values are higher at the candidate-level but the CFA-models fail to converge in both analyses. In three countries, some indicators of model quality are lower. These are all indicators of the factor analytical model. In two cases the candidate-level models did not converge, but this should be attributed to a low N. This means that on 88% of the indicators of scale quality, excluding the factor loadings, candidates score better than voters. All in all, the candidate-level models meet all criteria for a single dimensional interpretation in terms of the economic leftright of each method in only six countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece and Sweden. However, one can certainly say that the candidate space better fits a one-dimensional interpretation than the voter space (cf. Otjes, 2011).

5. Policy Representation

One may wonder: 'so what? Why does it matter?' The dimensionality of the political space has a strong effect on the quality of representation, as Thomassen (1999) has argued. If parties are concentrated along an economic left-right dimension and voters are spread out in the space more evenly, there will be a large discrepancy between voters and parties, especially those voters with 'inconsistent' views.

A simple way to illustrate the differences between parties and voters is figure 1: Figure 1A shows the distribution of all candidates on the items on egalitarianism and interventionism, with darker colours indicating a larger concentration of voters. The distribution of parties is almost perfectly single peaked, with a concentration of candidates among those who moderately favour egalitarianism and interventionism. Most candidates are concentrated on the diagonal of 'consistent' positions. The

distribution of voters differs strongly. Here one can see more peaks: at interventionist/egalitarian, egalitarian/non-interventionist and non-egalitarian/noninterventionist combinations voters are concentrated. A large segment of voters has views that are 'inconsistent' from the perspective of traditional models of representation. These voters are not on the left-right diagonal where most candidates find themselves. This means that when one collapses the political space into the diagonal (by opting for a one-dimensional representation), one would place voters with consistent views (like those who strongly favour redistribution but also strongly oppose government intervention) in the centre of the political space. In the twodimensional representation, however, these voters are actually as far from the centre as voters who strongly favour redistribution and government intervention.

Costello et al. (2012) offer a way to express the quality of representation by examining the distance between parties and voters: they propose calculating the distance between the average position of the voters of a party and the average position of the candidates of that party. In order to illustrate the effect of a one- and a multidimensional model, the Euclidian distance between parties and voters is calculated in a one-dimensional model (which distorts voter positions) and between parties and voters in four-dimensional model (where each economic item represents a separate dimension). The distances are divided by the maximum distance in the space.⁵ Following Costello et al. (2012), these differences are only calculated for parties that have 40 or more citizens voting for them in the European Parliament elections and 5 or more candidates running for office. Costello et al. (2012, p. 1241) found that policy congruence was consistently strongest on economic issues. Figure 2 illustrates the distances between party candidates and their voters per party. The x-axis shows the distance between parties and voters on a one-dimensional scale. On average, this distance is 0.12 (maximum is 1). If one unpacks the political space and represents the true diversity in the positions of voters, however, the average distance is 0.18: 47% greater. These values are shown in the y-axis of figure 2. As one can see the policy distances are consistently larger in the four-dimensional space than in the onedimensional space. This shows a one-dimensional space underestimates the representation problem.

⁵ The maximum is four for the one-dimensional model and the eight for the fourdimensional model.

5. Conclusion

The results presented in this paper show that voters have less consistent views about economic matters than party politicians. The views of politicians, in a majority of the cases, meet the requirements for a single-dimensional model: politicians that favour a more equal distribution of income also support the government intervention necessary to realise it. The views of politicians tend to cohere logically: for them the relationship between means and ends is clear. For citizens, however, economic issues are far more complex. They do not see the logical coherence between means and ends in these technical debates. Therefore their answers do not fit easily into a single-dimensional model. This conclusion will discuss the implications of these results for the quality of democratic representation in Europe and offer an agenda for further research.

Elections are an instrument to translate the preferences of voters to the political level (Costello et al., 2012). One important precondition for successful representation is that that voters' views and the policy positions of candidates are constrained by the same ideological dimension. This article shows that on economic issues voters' views appear to be unconstrained and unstructured, while on the same issues, candidates' views are more structured. This matters for the quality of democratic representation. If one forces the positions of voters into a one-dimensional scale, they are closer to party positions than in a four-dimensional representation. Voters with extreme but inconsistent views cannot find good policy representation: they may want less government intervention in the economy and a more equal distribution of resources: all that they can choose is more government and more equality or less government and less equality. This means that on economic issues, the representation deficit does not just concern differences in positions (e.g. voters are more left-wing than candidates) but it concerns the way in which voters and politicians use to understand economic questions. The absence of agreement between politicians and voters on how to understand economic questions should worry political scientists and decision-makers. Economic questions are the bulk of democratic decision-making and with the economic crisis, the importance of these issues have only increased.

From the results presented in this article, one can derive an agenda for further research. The first and most pressing issue is whether the patterns presented here are the result of an anomaly of one particular set of questions, or whether this phenomenon can be seen consistently in different European states. The results may also be the result of the context of the questionnaire, which was executed during the 2009 European Parliament election. It may be that the ongoing euro-crisis has diminished the strength of the economic left-right dimension at the voter level, as traditional leftwing and rightwing answers no longer fit the economic complexity. Therefore, it may be valuable to reanalyse existing voter and candidates' surveys. Doing this may help one to understand when, where and under what conditions voter positions on economic issues cohere.

The second issue is whether the discrepancy that was found here actually matters for political behaviour. One example: a large segment of citizens with 'inconsistent' views may find it difficult to find representation in a party system that is highly structured. This may have consequences for their volatility: these voters may be more volatile in their vote choice, because the framing of the elections matters strongly. Previously, Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) argued that because a large segment of voters has left-wing and authoritarian views, they may switch parties dependent on how the elections are framed, in terms of a choice over cultural issues or over economic issues: they may opt for the 'left' when elections concern economic issues and opt for the 'right' when elections concern immigration and integration. It may be that this phenomenon is also visible for the economic dimension itself: if economic issues are framed as to concern redistribution, the left may be stronger, if economic issues are framed as to concern government intervention, the right may profit.

5. Appendix on acquiescence bias

The conclusion that has been presented here and the conclusion that is presented by Costello et al. (2012) differ: using confirmatory factor analysis, they find that a three-dimensional structure fits a combined candidate and voter data set. This structure includes a three-item economic dimension. They control for acquiescence bias, the tendency of respondents to answer affirmatively to survey questions,

independent of the questions (Billiet & McClendon, 2001). Only with this response style factor, did their models meet basic scaling requirements.

Above, the substantive reasons for not controlling for acquiescence bias were discussed. There are also methodological reasons for not doing this. Billiet and McClendon (2001) offer a solution for acquiescence bias: construct a model for two sets of items that are balanced. This means that they have an equal number of items with 'positive' or 'negative' wording. And then estimate three factors: two substantial factor related to one of the two sets of items and then a third factor which has fixed loading of one for all items, called 'response style factor'. One cannot use the method described by Billiet and McClendon (2001) to model a single substantive dimension, because it requires *two* sets of balanced items and we only look at one set.

Costello et al. (2012) estimate three substantive dimensions, so they do not have this problem; their model has another issue: they do not used balanced sets of items. They use three economic items (two with a left-wing orientation and one with a right-wing orientation), while there *are* four economic items in the EES (two left-wing and two right-wing).⁶ The two other factors are not balanced either: four cultural items (three with 'conservative' wording and one with 'progressive' wording) and four European items (two with pro-European wording, one with anti-European wording and one freely loading item). Including a freely loading item appears to be necessary in order to make the models converge.

This appendix will more critically assess to what extent including a response style factor is a way to smooth out any problem with the economic left-right dimension. Table 5 provides all items included in this appendix. The model, presented in Table 3, is a base line for the analysis: models including a response style factor must perform better than these baseline models. One can only compare the direction and strength of the factor loadings for the four items included. In comparing one should note that in Table 3 two economic items are flipped, so they all go in the same left-right direction, while in Table 6 and 7 they are not in order to have a balanced set of items. One cannot compare the model fit measures, because these depend on the

⁶ They do not explain why the interventionism item has been excluded, but Costello et al. (2012, fn 3) lament the lack of balance in their items. They cite problems with the wording of question as the reason not to use the item (Costello personal correspondence), but if the item is poorly worded why does it not give a problem at the elite-level?

strength of other relationships as well (such as the cultural factor, the European factor and the response style factor).

Table 6 provides an overview of the models with a specification that follows Billiet and McClendon (2001) as precisely as possible (specification A, visualised in Figure 3). On two sets of balanced items three factors are estimated: an economic leftright dimension and a three-item European dimension (one pro-European, one anti-European and one freely loading item). With this specification only fifteen models converged. The key result is that in only two countries, the enterprise and interventionism factor loading are both in the correct direction and significantly different from zero: Germany and France. In those countries the results were already sufficiently strong in the model with the response style factor.⁷ In a direct comparison of the factor loadings, the inclusion of a response style factor leads to an improvement for four of the eleven factor loadings of the enterprise item. For the interventionism item however, the results are only significantly better than the result of the model without a response style factor in three countries.

Table 7 provides an overview of the models that are only slightly tweaked from Costello et al. (2012)'s specification (specification B, visualised in Figure 3). The only difference is that all four economic items were included. This model converges for nineteen countries. The inclusion of a response style factor leads to significantly better results for eight out of fourteen countries where models converged both with an without a response style factor. As for the interventionism item, the factor loadings are in the correct direction and significantly different from zero: Slovenia, Spain, Austria, France and Germany. In three of these, the results already were in the correct direction and significantly different from zero without the inclusion of a response style factor. For one of these countries the results previously did not converge (Slovenia). This means that only in Spain the inclusion of a response style factor under specification B would lead to a significantly different interpretation.

The main conclusion would be that the lack of coherence in the views of citizens on the economic issues is probably not the result of the response style of the voters. For the enterprise-item, the inclusion of a response style factor leads to a significant improvement, but for the interventionism item, this improvement is much

⁷ The models for the two other countries that conformed to the expectations without a response style factor did not converge with this specification.

smaller. In two specifications, the inclusion of the response style factor only leads to a substantially different interpretation for the interventionism item in one case.

Therefore the poor results are more likely to be substantive in nature than that they are the cause of a methodological singularity.

Country	Candidates	Respondents
Austria	42	897
Belgium	56	796
Bulgaria	6	826
Cyprus	7	882
Czech Republic	21	908
Denmark	24	824
Estonia	24	858
Finland	40	897
France	112	871
Germany	140	931
Greece	20	915
Hungary	25	869
Ireland	7	880
Italy	59	844
Lithuania	38	827
Latvia	30	771
Luxembourg	15	877
Malta	9	685
Netherlands	72	920
Poland	35	844
Portugal	17	790
Romania	23	739
Slovakia	26	838
Slovenia	18	914
Spain	56	824
Swedish	159	884
United Kingdom	242	892

Table 1: Number of Respondents

Table 2: Items

Label	Question	Options
State	Public services and industries should be in state ownership.	A:5
Enterprise	Private enterprise is best to solve [country's] economic problems.	A:5*
Interventionism	Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy	A:5*
Egalitarianism	Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people.	A:5

A: Agreement; P: Position on a scale; number of answer categories; * indicates that the items was recoded.

Polity	Н	α.	\mathcal{L}	<u> </u>	Confirmat	orv Fact	or Analy	sis	
1 only			RMSFA	CFI	SRMR	01 y 1 act	or mary.	515	
			KWSLA	CFI	SKWIK	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	0.21	0.49	0.11	0.0	0.04	0.45	0.36	0.64	0.36
Belgium	-0.01	-0.05	0.11	0.9	0.04	(0.34, 0.55) 0.53	(0.26, 0.46) 0.20	(0.52, 0.75) - 0.22	(0.28, 0.45) -0.53
Bulgaria	0.09	0.25	0.07	0.07	0.05	(0.30, 0.75) 0.80	(0.07, 0.33) 0.42	(-0.35, -0.10) 0.29	(-0.76, -0.30) - 0.17
Cyprus	0.01	0.02	0.11	0.89	0.04	(0.61, 0.99)	(0.3, 0.55)	(0.21, 0.38)	(-0.26, -0.08)
Cyprus	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.80	0.03	(0.20, 0.47)	(0.26, 0.61)	(-0.32, -0.05)	(-0.43, -0.13)
Czech Republic	0.08	0.24	0.11	0.82	0.04	0.90 (0.26, 1.55)	0.33	0.14	-0.07
Denmark	0.10	0.28			Non	-converg	ence	,	,
Estonia	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.00	0.05	0.41	0.43	-0.07	-0.40
F ¹ 1	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.68	0.05	(0.26, 0.55)	(0.30, 0.57)	(-0.21, 0.06)	(-0.54 -0.25)
Finland	0.09	0.25	0.07	0.89	0.03	0.282	0.929	0.12	-0.03
France	0.13	0.34				0.57	0.24	0.37	0.22
1 fullee	0.110	0.01	0.09	0.83	0.03	(0.35, 0.79)	(0.13, 0.34)	(0.20, 0.54)	(0.09, 0.34)
Germany	0.23	0.51	0 14	0.84	0.04	0.44	0.44	0.52	0.41
Greece	0.09	0.26	0.11	0.01	Non	(0.33, 0.55)	(0.33, 0.55)	(0.41, 0.64)	(0.31, 0.51)
Hungary	0.00	0.20			NOI		0.66	-0.07	-0.27
Tungary	0.00	0.01	0.07	0.88	0.03	(0.174 0.44)	(0.39, 0.92)	(-0.16, 0.03)	(-0.4, -0.14)
Ireland	0.04	0.11	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.36	0.50	0.14	-0.18
T4 - 1	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.89	0.02	(0.14, 0.58)	(0.22, 0.78)	(0.01, 0.28)	(-0.3, -0.07)
Italy	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.88	0.03	0.40	0.46	-0.04	-0.35
Lithuania	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.26, 0.33)	0.51	-0.20	-0.29
Entitudina	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.88	0.03	(0.27, 0.51)	(0.383, 0.708)	(-0.32, -0.08)	(-0.42, -0.17)
Latvia	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.72	0.04	0.56	0.27	0.05	-0.29
Luxambourg	0.06	0.17	0.10	0.72	0.04 Non	(0.10, 1.01)	(0.06, 0.48)	(-0.13, 0.22)	(-0.53, -0.05)
Malta	0.00	0.17			INOI			0.12	0.24
Ivialla	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.85	0.03	(0.34, 0.76)	(0.31, 0.69)	-0.12	- U. 24 (-0.36, -0.13)
Netherlands	0.08	0.22	0.00	0.72	0.02	0.28	0.16	0.26	0.33
D 1 1	0.00	0.0	0.06	0.73	0.03	(0.02, 0.53)	(-0.05, 0.37)	(0.07, 0.46)	(0.07, 0.58)
Poland	0.09	0.26	0.1	0.79	0.04	0.55	0.37	0.32	-0.04
Portugal	0.02	0.07		0.175	0.01	0.82	0.19	-0.04	-0.14
			0.07	0.78	0.03	(-0.23, 1.86)	(-0.06, 0.43)	(-0.14, 0.05)	(-0.35, 0.07)
Romania	0.07	0.21			Non	-converg	ence		
Slovakia	0.09	0.27			Non	-converg	ence		
Slovenia	0.05	0.15			Non	-converg	ence		
Spain	0.07	0.20	0.10	0.00	0.05	0.43	0.42	0.19	-0.10
C 1	0.16	0.41	0.12	0.60	0.05	(0.130, 0.73)	(0.12, 0.72)	(0.05, 0.32)	(-0.23, 0.04)
Sweden	0.16	0.41	0.10	0.91	0.04	0.4/	U.01 (0.50 0.71)	U.SI (0.41.0.60)	
United Kingdom	0.09	0.26	0.10	0.00	0.04	0.57	0.45	0.40	-0.14
0			0.12	0.82	0.04	(0.44, 0.70)	(0.33, 0.56)	(0.31, 0.5)	(-0.24, -0.04)

Table 3: Voter Level Indicators of Scale Quality

Country	П	a			Confirma	аюгу гас	tor Anal	ysis	
			RMSEA	CFI	SRMR	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	0.73	0.9	0.06	1	0.02	0.77	0.84	0.92	0.81
Belgium	0.51	0.77	0	1	0.02	0.65	0.64	0.7	0.73
Bulgaria	0.51	0.77	0	1	0.02 Te	(0.44, 0.85)	(0.44, 0.85)	(0.52, 0.89)	(0.55, 0.92)
Cuprus						o little ca	.505		
Cyprus					10		ses	0.45	0.20
Czech Republic	0.61	0.82	0	1	0.01	(0.10.0.91)	0.86	0.45	0.32
Denmark			Ū		0101	0.91	0.79	0.73	0.15, 0.75)
Demnark	0.28	0.57	0	1	0.03	(0.75, 1.07)	(0.59, 0.98)	(0.52, 0.95)	(0.1, 0.81)
Estonia	0 32	0.61	0.42	0.50	0.12	0.84	0.7	0.56	0
F ' 1 1	0.52	0.01	0.42	0.39	0.12	(0.48, 1.19)	(0.33, 1.05)	(0.21, 0.91)	(-0.49, 0.49)
Finland	0.51	0.77	0.13	0.91	0.05	(0.09, 0.71)	0.03	0.72	(0.17.0.82)
France						0.74	0.75	0.84	0.51
Tance	0.57	0.8	0.03	1	0.02	(0.64, 0.85)	(0.64, 0.86)	(0.75, 0.94)	(0.35, 0.66)
Germany	0.67	0.97	0	1	0.01	0.79	0.77	0.87	0.72
0	0.07	0.07	0	1	0.01	(0.71, 0.87)	(0.69, 0.85)	(0.81, 0.93)	(0.63, 0.82)
Greece	0.51	0.75	0	1	0.05	0.53	0.58	0.86	0.67
Hungary	0.28	0.55	-	-	No	on-conver	gence	(0.55, 1.10)	(0.54, 1.00)
Ireland	0.20	0.55			Te	on little ca	Senee		
Itela					П		0.72	0.95	0.21
nary	0.44	0.72	0	1	0.01	0.71 (0.53.0.88)	(0.55, 0.89)	(0.70, 1.01)	U.21 (-0.06.0.48)
Lithuania	0.23	0.5			No	on-conver	gence	(000,101)	(0100, 0110)
Latvia	0.20	0.0				0.34	0.25	0.7	0.56
	0.02	0.07	0	1	0.01	(-0.04, 0.72)	(-0.15, 0.66)	(0.19, 1.21)	(0.11, 1.02)
Luxembourg					To	oo little ca	ses		
Malta					Тс	oo little ca	ses		
Netherlands						0.58	0.7	0.75	0.67
i (etherianas	0.49	0.76	0.24	0.89	0.06	(0.36, 0.80)	(0.50, 0.89)	(0.57, 0.93)	(0.48, 0.86)
Poland	03	0.58	0	1	0.03	0.31	0.98	0.72	0.1
Dortugal	0.5	0.50	0	1	0.05	(-0.02, 0.64)	(0.51, 1.45)	(0.33, 1.09)	(-0.25, 0.45)
Portugal	0.07	0.00				o nue ca	ses		
Romania	0.37	0.66			No	on-conver	gence		
Slovakia	0.66	0.85			No	on-conver	gence		
Slovenia					To	oo little ca	ses		
Spain	0.40	0 75	0.25	0.07	0.07	0.62	0.63	0.85	0.54
-	0.48	0.75	0.25	0.87	0.07	(0.36, 0.89)	(0.36, 0.90)	(0.61, 1.10)	(0.29, 0.78)
Sweden	0.55	0.79	0.06	1	0.02	0.71	0.73	0.78	0.6
United Kingdom			0.00	1	0.02	0.01, 0.81)	0.71	0.78	0.49
	0.45	0.74	0.11	0.97	0.03	(0.51, 0.71)	(0.61, 0.81)	(0.69, 0.88)	(0.38, 0.61)

Table 4: Candidate Level Indicators of Scale QualityCountryH α Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Table 5: Items

Label	Ouestion	Options	Direction
State	Public services and industries should be	A:5	Leftwing
	in state ownership.		U
Enterprise	Private enterprise is best to solve	A:5	Rightwing
	[country's] economic problems.		
Interventionism	Politics should abstain from intervening	A:5	Rightwing
	in the economy		
Egalitarianism	Income and wealth should be	A:5	Leftwing
	redistributed towards ordinary people.		
Abortion	Women should be free to decide on	A: 5	Leftwing
	matters of abortion		
Immigration	Immigration to (country) should be	A: 5	Rightwing
	decreased significantly		
Sentences	People who break the law should get	A: 5	Rightwing
	much harsher sentences than now		D. 1.
Marriage	Same-sex marriage should be prohibited	A: 5	Rightwing
	by law	• ~	
Referendum	EU treaty changes should be decided by	A: 5	Anti-European
D 1' (referendum	A . 5	Dec Esserence
Parliament	The European Parliament takes into	A: 5	Pro-European
	Consideration the concerns of		
Trat	European chizens	۸.5	Dro Europaan
11081	Furonean Union	п. Ј	110-European
Democracy	How satisfied are you with the way	D • Л	Pro European
Democracy	democracy works in the EU?	1.4	110-European
	democracy works in the EO?		

A: Agreement; P: Position on a scale; number of answer categories.

eountry		```		ion y nuce	ion rinary	515	
	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria			No	n-converg	ence		
Relaium			110	0.24	0.02	0.13	0.85
Deigiuili	0.09	0.75	0.05	(0.01, 0.47)	(-0.06.0.09)	(-0.00, 0.27)	(0.06.1.65)
Bulgaria			No	n-converg	ence	(0.00,0.27)	(0.00, 1.05)
Cummus			N.		ence		
Cyprus			INC	on-converg	ence		
Czech Republic	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.56	0.39	-0.36	0.02
	0.00	0.91	0.04	(0.44, 0.68)	(0.28, 0.50)	(-0.48, -0.24)	(-0.09, 0.13)
Denmark			NC	on-converg	ence		
Estonia	0.09	0.96	0.04	0.36	0.42	-0.04	0.29
	0.08	0.80	0.04	(0.26, 0.47)	(0.32, 0.53)	(-0.16, 0.08)	(0.19, 0.38)
Finland			No	on-converg	ence		
France	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.49	0.27	-0.51	-0.19
	0.05	0.91	0.04	(0.36, 0.61)	(0.16, 0.38)	(-0.64, -0.38)	(-0.29, -0.08)
Germany	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.51	0.48	-0.53	-0.39
~	0.07	0.90	0.05	(0.42, 0.60)	(0.39, 0.56)	(-0.63, -0.45)	(-0.47, -0.30)
Greece			No	on-converg	ence		
Hungary				0.31	0.34	-0.00	0.20
	0.05	0.92	0.03	(0.18, 0.43)	(0.20, 0.48)	(-0.16, 0.15)	(0.08, 0.33)
Ireland	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.33	0.46	-0.19	0.20
	0.06	0.83	0.04	(0.18, 0.48)	(0.29, 0.64)	(-0.32, -0.06)	(0.08, 0.33)
Italy			No	on-converg	ence		
Lithuania				0.38	0.55	0.09	0.13
	0.04	0.94	0.03	(0.26, 0.49)	(0.41, 0.69)	(-0.05, 0.23)	(0.00, 0.26)
Latvia			No	on-converg	ence		
Luxembourg			No	on-converg	ence		
Malta			No	n_converg	ence		
Natharlanda			No	n converg	onco		
			INC			0.40	0.04
Poland	0.06	0.88	0.03	0.47	0.38	-0.42	-0.04
Doutu col	0.00	0.00	0.05	(0.35, 0.60)	(0.26, 0.51)	(-0.56, -0.27)	(-0.16, 0.09)
Portugal	0.05	0.89	0.03	(0.11, 0.41)	(0.15, 0.41)	-0.02	(0.10, 0.34)
Romania				0.49	0.37	-0.40	-0.02
Komama	0.03	0.96	0.03	(0.36, 0.63)	(0.24, 0.50)	(-0.53, -0.26)	(-0.14, 0.11)
Slovakia				0.60	0.25	-0.43	-0.06
biovalla	0.04	0.83	0.04	(0.41, 0.78)	(0.14, 0.36)	(-0.58, -0.28)	(-0.17, 0.06)
Slovenia	0.00	0.07		0.33	0.32	-0.24	0.00
	0.03	0.96	0.02	(0.19, 0.48)	(0.18, 0.46)	(-0.38, -0.10)	(-0.13, 0.13)
Spain			No	on-converg	ence		
Sweden	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.61	-0.54	-0.05
	0.06	0.93	0.03	(0.43, 0.59)	(0.53, 0.69)	(-0.63, -0.45)	(-0.15, 0.04)
United Kingdom	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.44	0.34	-0.68	0.00
	0.08	0.83	0.05	(0.29, 0.59)	(0.22, 0.46)	(-0.89, -0.45)	(-0.10, 0.11)

Table 6: Voter Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification ACountryConfirmatory Factor Analysis

v	Comminutory ructor mutysis						
	RMSEA	CFI	SRMR	State	Egalitarianism	Enterprise	Interventionism
Austria	0.07	0.0	0.06	0.45	0.4	-0.69	-0.33
Polgium	0.07	0.9	0.00	(0.37, 0.54)	(0.31, 0.49)	(-0.79, -0.6)	(-0.41, -0.25)
			1		0.27	0.46	0.05
Bulgaria	0.03	0.95	0.04	(0.47, 0.72)	0.57 (0.25, 0.48)	-U.40	(-0.06.0.17)
Cyprus				0.15	0.33	-0.18	0.06
	0.04	0.89	0.04	(-0.03, 0.34)	(0.1, 0.57)	(-0.35, -0.01)	(-0.06, 0.19)
Czech Republic			N	lon-conve	ergence		
Denmark			N	lon-conve	ergence		
Estonia	0 0 7	0.00	0.07	0.44	0.31	-0.22	0.27
	0.07	0.83	0.06	(0.29, 0.59)	(0.2, 0.43)	(-0.36, -0.08)	(0.15, 0.39)
Finland	0.07	0.81	0.06	0.44	0.54	-0.21	-0.01
Franco	0.07	0.01	0.00	(0.32, 0.56)	(0.4, 0.68)	(-0.32, -0.1) 0 54	(-0.12, 0.1) 0 10
France	0.05	0.9	0.05	(0.34, 0.53)	(0.17, 0.36)	-0.04	(-0.29, -0.09)
Germany	-			0.48	0.46	-0.57	-0.43
-	0.07	0.85	0.06	(0.39, 0.57)	(0.37, 0.54)	(-0.66, -0.48)	(-0.51, -0.34)
Greece			N	on-conve	ergence		
Hungary	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.48	0.29	-0.18	0.09
T 1 1	0.05	0.95	0.04	(0.35, 0.62)	(0.19, 0.39)	(-0.3, -0.07)	(-0.02, 0.21)
Ireland	0.06	0.84	0.05	0.48	0.29	-0.18	(0.02, 0.21)
Italy				0.29	0.3	-0.41	0.03
Itury	0.05	0.86	0.05	(0.13, 0.45)	(0.12, 0.48)	(-0.6, -0.23)	(-0.11, 0.18)
Lithuania	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.36	0.45	0.03	0.12
Lateria	0.04	0.92	0.04	(0.23, 0.49)	(0.3, 0.6)	(-0.1, 0.15)	(-0.01, 0.25)
					rgence		
Luxembourg			Ν	on-conve	ergence		
Malta			N	lon-conve	ergence		
Netherlands			N	lon-conve	ergence		
Poland	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.43	0.4	-0.42	-0.04
N 1	0.06	0.84	0.05	(0.31, 0.55)	(0.28, 0.53)	(-0.56, -0.28)	(-0.17, 0.09)
Portugal	0 0 -	0.00	~ ~ ~	0.19	0.44	-0.2	0.06
	0.05	0.88	0.05	(0.06, 0.32)	(0.22, 0.65)	(-0.34, -0.06)	(-0.08, 0.21)
Romania	0.05	0.88	0.05	0.43	0.39	-0.4	0
Slovelrie	0.05	0.00	0.05	(0.31, 0.56)	(0.26, 0.51) 0 27	(-0.53, -0.27)	(-0.13, 0.13) 0 00
SIOVAKIA	0.06	0.85	0.05	(0.48, 0.84)	(0.15, 0.4)	(-0.53, -0.28)	(-0.2, 0.02)
Slovenia	0.07	0.0	0.07	0.66	0.17	-0.19	-0.11
~ .	0.06	0.8	0.06	(0.24, 1.08)	(0.03, 0.3)	(-0.35, -0.03)	(-0.22, -0.01)
Spain	0.06	0.82	0.06	0.24	0.23	-0.58	-0.19
Sweden	0.00	0.02	0.00	(0.14, 0.35)	(0.12, 0.34)	(-0.71, -0.45)	(-0.3, -0.08) 0 07
Swedell	0.06	0.89	0.05	(0.42, 0.59)	(0.52, 0.69)	-0.JJ (-0.63, -0.47)	-0.07
United Kingdom			N	lon-conve	ergence		

Table 7: Voter Level Indicators of Scale Quality for Model Specification BCountryConfirmatory Factor Analysis





Interventionism

Interventionism

Figure 2: Distances between parties and voters in one and four-dimensional models



1-D distances

Figure 3: Model specification A







References

- Achterberg, P., Houtman, D., & Derks, A. (2011). Two of a Kind?: An Empirical Investigation of Anti-Welfarism and Economic Egalitarianism. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 75(4), 748–760. doi:10.1093/poq/nfr034
- APSA. (1950). *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge.
- Billiet, J. B., & McClendon, M. J. (2001). Modelling acquiescence in measurement models for two balanced sets of items. *Structural Equation Modeling*, 7(4), 608– 628.
- Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction*. London: Routledge.
- Brown, T. A. (2006). *Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research*. New York: Guildford Press.
- Budge, I., & Robertson, D. (1987). Do parties differ and how? Comparative discriminant and factor analyses. In I. Budge, D. Hearl, & D. Robertson (Eds.), *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-war Election Programmes in Nineteen Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Butler, D. E., & Stokes, D. (1974). Political Change in Britain. London: Macmillan.

- Carmines, E. ., & Stimson, J. A. (1980). The Two Faces of Issue Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 74(1).
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In *Ideology and Its Discontents*. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Coombs, C. H. (1964). A Theory of Data. Hoboken: Wiley.
- Cortina, J. M. (1993). What is Coefficient Alpha. An Examination of Theory and Application. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 78(1), 98–104.
- Costello, R., Thomassen, J., & Rosema, M. (2012). Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties, (January 2013), 37–41.
- Cronbach, L. (1951). Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests. *Psychometrika*, *16*, 297–334.
- Derks, A. (2004). Are the underprivileged really that economically "leftist"? Attitudes towards economic redistribution and the welfare state in Flanders. *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(4), 509–521. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00163.x
- Derks, A. (2006). Populism and the Ambivalence of Egalitarianism. How Do the Underprivileged Reconcile a Right Wing Party Preference with Their Socio-Economic Attitudes? World Political Science Review, 2(3), 528–553. doi:10.2202/.1012

Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper Collins.

- Evans, G., & Heath, A. F. (1995). The measurement of left-right and libertarian authoritarian values: a comparison of balanced and unbalanced scales. *Quality and Ouantity*, 191–206.
- Evans, G., Heath, A. F., & Lalljee, M. G. (1996). Measuring left-right and libertarianauthoritarian values in the British electorate. *British Journal of Sociology*, 47, 93–112.

- Gabel, M. J., & Anderson, C. J. (2002). The Structure of Citizen Attitudes and the European Political Space. *Comparative Political Studies*. doi:10.1177/001041402236298
- Giebler, H., Haus, E., & Weßels, B. (2010). 2009 European Election Candidate Study - Codebook. Berlin.
- Goerres, A., & Prinzen, K. (2011). Can We Improve the Measurement of Attitudes Towards the Welfare State? A Constructive Critique of Survey Instruments with Evidence from Focus Groups. *Social Indicators Research*, 109(3), 515–534. doi:10.1007/s11205-011-9915-5
- Heath, A. F., Evans, G., & Martin, J. (1994). The measurement of core beliefs and values: the development of balanced socialist/laissez-faire and libertarian/authoritarian scales. *British Journal of Political Science*, 24, 115–132.
- Hix, S., & Noury, A. (2009). After Enlargement: Voting Patterns in the Sixth European Parliament. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *34*(2), 159–174. doi:10.3162/036298009788314282
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Wilson, C. J. (2002). Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration? *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(8), 965– 989. doi:10.1177/001041402236310
- Inglehart, R. (1984). The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society. In R. J. Dalton, S. C. Flanagan, & P. A. Beck (Eds.), *Electoral Change*. *Realignment and Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (1994). *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kline, P. (1999). Handbook of Psychological Testing. London: Routledge.
- Knutsen, O., & Kumlin, S. (2005). Value Orientation and Party Choice. In J. Thomassen (Ed.), *The European Voter*. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (pp. 125–166). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kriesi, H. (2010). Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage Based on Values. *West European Politics*, *33*(3), 673–685. doi:10.1080/01402381003654726
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(6), 921–956. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00644.x
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008). West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Laswell, H. D. (1936). *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How.* Colombus: McGraw-Hill book Company.
- Lipset, S. M. (1960). *Political Man: The social bases of politics*. London: Mercury Books.
- Lipset, S. M., Lazerfeld, P. F., Barton, A. H., & Linz, J. (1954). The Psychology of Voting. An Analysis of Political Behaviour. In Addison-Wesley (Ed.), *Handbook* of Social Psychology. Reading.
- Mair, P. (2007). Left-Right Orientations. In R. J. Dalton & H.-D. Klingemann (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behaviour*. Oxford: University Press.
- Mair, P. (2009). Representative versus Responsible Government. Cologne.
- Milyo, J. (2000). Logical deficiencies in spatial models: A constructive critique. *Public Choice*, *105*(3/4), 274–289.

Mokken, R. J. (1971). A Theory and Procedure of Scale Analysis. Berlin: De Gruyter.

- Otjes, S. (2011). The Fortuyn Effect revisited: How did the LPF affect the Dutch parliamentary party system. *Acta Politica*, *46*(4), 400–424.
- Otjes, S. (2013). What's left of the economic left-right dimension? And what's right about it? The coherence of economic views of citizens. In *Politicologenetmaal*.
- Sperber, N. (2010). Three Million Trotskyists? Explaining extreme left voting in France in the 2002 presidential election. *European Journal of Political Research*, 49(3), 359–392.
- Thomassen, J. (1999). Political Communication between Political Elites and Mass Publics: The Role of Belief Systems. In W. E. Miller, R. Pierce, J. Thomassen, R. Herrera, S. Holmberg, P. Esaiasson, & B. Weßels (Eds.), *Policy Representation in Western Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van der brug, W. (2008). *Een Crisis in de partijendemocratie*. *Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Amsterdam University, Amsterdam.
- Van der Brug, W., & Van Spanje, J. (2009). Immigration, Europe and the "new" cultural dimension. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(3), 309–334. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.00841.x
- Van Egmond, M. H., Sapir, E. V., Van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S. B., & Franklin, M. N. (2010). EES 2009 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Amsterdam.
- Van Schuur, W. (2003). Mokken Scale Analysis: Between the Guttman Scale and Parametric Item Reponse Theory. *Political Analysis*, *11*(2), 139–163.
- Van Schuur, W., & Kiers, H. (1994). Why Factor Analysis is Often the Incorrect Model for Analyzing Bipolar Concepts, and What Model to Use Instead. Applied Psychological Measurement, 18(2), 97.
- Wagner, M., & Kritzinger, S. (2012). Ideological dimensions and vote choice: Age group differences in Austria. *Electoral Studies*, 31(2), 285–296. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.11.008
- Walczak, A., Van der Brug, W., & de Vries, C. E. (2012). Long- and short-term determinants of party preferences: Inter-generational differences in Western and East Central Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 31(2), 273–284. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.11.007
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.